

JPRS-UMA-84-006

13 January 1984

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 19 and 20, October 1983

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

13 January 1984

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 19 and 20, October 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language semi-monthly journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 19, October 1983 (signed to press 20 September 1983) and No 20, October 1983 (signed to press 4 October 1983).

CONTENTS

No 19

By Right and Duty of the Soviet Citizen (pp 3-7)
(Editorial) (not translated)

Veterans in Formation (pp 8-13)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

A Movement of Millions (pp 14-19)
(M. Madyakin, I. Yurchenko) (not translated)

Increased Use of Robots, Industrial Manipulators Described (pp 20-21)
(V. Dolgishev) 1

FOR EXERCISES IN THE SYSTEM OF MARXIST-LENINIST OFFICER TRAINING

Increasing the Role of the Party in the Leadership of the Armed Forces
(pp 22-28)
(S. Voytenko) (not translated)

Recommendations for Seminar Exercise (pp 29-31)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

OUR CALENDAR

Materials for Agitation on Rocket Forces, Artillery Day (pp 32-36)
(Unattributed) 4

QUESTIONS OF TRAINING AND TROOP INDOCTRINATION

From Analysis to Action (pp 37-42)
(N. Red'kin) (not translated)

Greater Reliance, Training for NCO Personnel Recommended (pp 43-47)
(V. Bulgakov) 13

PEDAGOGICAL SKILL OF AN OFFICER: EXPERIENCE, PROBLEMS, VIEWS

The Chief of a Chair (pp 48-52)
(N. Vasil'yev) (not translated)

REPORTS AND ELECTIONS: THE ROSTRUM OF A COMMUNIST

A Word Directed to People (pp 53-58)
(N. Solov'yev) (not translated)

FOR YOU, THE YOUNG COMMUNISTS

A School of Party Tempering (pp 59-63)
(B. Yamshanov) (not translated)

HIGH QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS FOR IDEOLOGICAL WORK

Freshness of Thought and Clarity of Exposition (Comments on Lecture Work)
(pp 64-69)
(V. Gorlenko) (not translated)

FOR THE LEADERS OF POLITICAL EXERCISE GROUPS

The CPSU on Vigilance and Combat Readiness of the Troops and Naval
Forces at the Present Stage (pp 70-76)
(A. Rychkov) (not translated)

IN THE FRATERNAL ARMIES

A Testing for Strength (The 40th Anniversary of the Polish People's
Army) (pp 77-81)
(A. Verbitskiy) (not translated)

ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS

Progress, Military Development of South Yemen Traced (pp 82-85)
(V. Pozdnyakov) 19

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Textbook Reviewed on Philosophical Questions in Military Affairs
(pp 86-87)
(A. Dmitriyev) 26

To Prepare Youth for Military Service (p 88)
(I. Svetlichnyy) (not translated)

FROM THE EDITORS' MAIL

A Meeting (pp 89-90)
(V. Tiunov) (not translated)

To Live by Traditions! (pp 91-92)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

IN THE DISTRICTS, TROOP GROUPS AND FLEETS

At the Center of Attention - A Most Important Component of Combat
Readiness - In the Red Banner Central Asian Military District -
A Memorial Plaque Unveiled - To Be an Example, To Lead - To Increase
the Combat Skill of Aviators - The Communists Set the Tone - On a
Level of the New Tasks - In a Creative Situation - Traditions are
Continued - Cosmonauts--The Guests of Aviators (pp 93-96)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

Military Journals Reply to Criticism in Indoctrinational Work (p 96)
(Unattributed) 30

No 20

Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Yu. V. Andropov
(pp 3-6)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

Biographical Sketch Honors Ustinov's 75th Birthday (pp 9-13)
(Unattributed) 32

Constant Attention to Political Training (pp 14-18)
(Editorial) (not translated)

A Unity of Ideological and Organizational Work for Military Personnel
(pp 19-28)
(B. Utkin) (not translated)

For the Youth--The Construction and Defense of Communism (pp 29-35)
(V. Mishin) (not translated)

PAGES OF THE GREAT FEAT

The Dnepr--A River of Heroes (pp 36-42)
(M. Manakin) (not translated)

QUESTIONS OF TRAINING AND TROOP INDOCTRINATION

Efforts to Increase Role Effectiveness of Staff Officers Trained (pp 43-48)
(A. Dobrov) 38

AN OFFICER'S PEDAGOGICAL SKILL: EXPERIENCE, PROBLEMS, JUDGMENTS

Plus a Special Approach to Each Man (Reflections on the Letter by the
Commander of the Ship Subunit Lt A. Grigor'yev) (pp 49-54)
(O. Tomashko) (not translated)

PARTY CONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Wider, Better Use of Internal Party Information Urged (pp 55-61) 45
(V. Trushin)

REPORTS AND ELECTIONS: THE COMMUNIST'S ROSTRUM

Tomorrow--A Commander and Indoctrinator (pp 62-64)
(N. Loshchinin) (not translated)

HIGH QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS FOR IDEOLOGICAL WORK

To Know in Order to Act (On the Start of the Training Year in the
Party Education System) (pp 65-69)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

The Lieutenant Arrived at the Officer Club... (pp 70-75)
(N. Kostikov) (not translated)

FOR LEADERS OF POLITICAL EXERCISE GROUPS

Discipline--An Important Condition for Combat Readiness (pp 76-82)
(V. Khrobostov) (not translated)

ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS

Soviet View of Reagan Economic, Defense Policies Traced (pp 83-87) 50
(I. Shtukaturvov)

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Memoirs of Early World War II Tank Battles Reviewed (pp 88-90) 59
(I. Igoshev)

Textbook on Political Divisions of World Reviewed (pp 91-92) 64
(P. Panasenko)

IN THE DISTRICTS, TROOP GROUPS AND FLEETS

Improving Lecture Propaganda - A Useful Talk - Loyal to One's Word -
In the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District - In the Order of
Lenin Leningrad Military District - In the Southern Group of Forces -
A TV Studio Has Been Created (pp 93-96)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

INCREASED USE OF ROBOTS, INDUSTRIAL MANIPULATORS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 83 pp 20-21

[Article by Engr-Capt V. Dolgishev: "Dependable Assistants of Man"]

[Text] Robots.... This word has long been familiar to us from science fiction stories and novels. For more than 50 years now it has existed in pages full of bold foresight. The Czech writer Karel Capek first used the term "machine with a man-like action." And it is no surprise that robots continue to live in our imagination although only remotely reminiscent of man and acting according to the image and manner of its prototype.

All of this is seemingly quite natural. But the robots shown at the permanent exhibit in the Machine Building Pavilion of the USSR VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements] are externally in no way similar to man. This is not necessary. Frequently the technically most successful and economic is a variation where the automatic manipulator is placed directly on the machine and the automatic control device at another place.

Many of the metal assistants of man shown at the exhibit are "one-arms." There are also those which are a single complex. Still, no matter how the industrial robots differ from the models "thought up" by the science fiction writers, this "iron" tribe, if one looks closely at it, evokes sympathy. For they not only open up the prospects of creating fundamentally new production processes, where man, starting from designing and planning of production and ending with the output of the finished product, does not touch a finger to a tool. Even now robots make it possible to increase labor productivity by 1.5-2-fold and to improve production methods themselves. They provide an opportunity to quickly adapt production to turning out a new product. Manipulators also solve social problems as they take on heavy, sometimes dangerous and uninteresting jobs, working days without tiring.

Industrial robots--the offspring of scientific and technical progress--symbolize the start of major changes both in the production and the social sphere. The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress emphasized that the development and introduction of miniature electronic control devices and industrial robots open up truly revolutionary opportunities. Serious attention was given to this problem also at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at it, the situation in the area of labor productivity will be radically changed by the wide

employment of robots, particularly in those production areas where manual, heavy physical, unskilled and monotonous labor is still employed. This will provide an opportunity for hundreds of thousands of people to work under other, better conditions and to gain greater satisfaction from their labor.

The permanent exhibit "Advanced Models of Automatic Manipulators" also shows what are the most recent developments in the area of robot building. Very eloquent are the figures shown on a stand in the entry hall. In 1975-1981, the nation put into operation 8,500 automatic manipulators. This made it possible not only to increase labor productivity and improve product quality but also release 23,000 workers from heavy physical labor. In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the Soviet national economy will receive 40,000-45,000 industrial robots and this will release around 100,000 persons. Here the annual economic effect will be approximately 500 million rubles.

A major step ahead in this area is to be taken by the nation in 1983. The fleet of automatic manipulators will be enlarged by more than 7,700 units. By the end of the five-year plan, it will be over 50,000 units.

The exhibit is constantly being supplemented with new displays. The "professions" of robots are varied. They are smiths, loaders, painters and welders. The examples shown here evoke great interest among the visitors. For example, there are many people around the overhead robot designed for automatically loading and unloading machining equipment, in particular semi-automatic devices with numerical program control.

What then is the main task of the lathe operator, the milling machine operator or grinder? To control the machine. But in addition he must also place the stock in it and take out the machined piece. But the stock and pieces sometimes are quite heavy weighing 10, 30 and even 50 kg. The machining of these may take up only several minutes. The remaining time, particularly under the conditions of series production, is spent on monotonous, heavy operations involved in setting up the stock and removing the article. This comprises more than nine-tenths of all working time. This heavy, unskilled work can also be assumed by the suspended automatic manipulator which differs, incidentally, from analogs in its comparatively low cost, increased reliability and higher degree of standardization with other robots. This increases the use factor of the equipment, significantly shortens the production cycle and improves product quality. The annual economic effect from the introduction of a single suspended automatic manipulator is 6,000 rubles a year.

Also popular with the visitors is another innovation, an overhead transport system with manipulators. It has 32 steel hands and is capable of tending 512 work areas and transport loads up to 25 kg with an accuracy up to 10 mm. Just one such system provides a gain of 115,000 rubles a year.

Industrial robots, in contrast to automata, can perform a large number of operations. In order to switch from one operation to another, it is merely a question of changing the program in the robot's control system. If another type of article must be produced, then one merely "resets" the movement of the robot's working parts.

Of interest on this level, for example, is the cyclical industrial robot, the "Strela-3." It was developed by a group of authors from the Kuybyshev Polytechnical Institute. "Strela-3" is designed for the automatic loading of pieces into metal-cutting machines or press equipment and for performing assembly and inspection operations. The robot can have one or two "arms." These can be placed at different heights relative to the base. The angle between them can be varied from 0 to 180°. Thus, an optimum set-up of the robot is achieved depending upon the technical requirements. The small size of "Strela-3" provides an opportunity to install it in complicated systems and in automated lines.

In the long run, the use of such manipulators will make it possible to create fully automated sections controlled no longer by an operator but rather by a computer. Here labor productivity will be 4-5-fold above the ordinary.

Before the end of the current five-year plan, almost 600 fully automated lines, sections and shops will be created and this will free many thousands of workers and from the most difficult health-injurious operations.

We have been discussing the so-called first generation robots. But the exhibit also shows the models and individual assemblies of more advanced human assistants, the second and third generation robots which are capable of "feeling," "seeing" and "talking," in flexibly changing their conduct depending upon the actual situation. The STZ-3 unit at the exhibit has attracted the attention of the visitors. This is designed for the information support for robots. The basic element of the unit is a high-speed laser distance measurer which operates automatically in an interval of 0.2-7 m. The error factor in measuring distance is just 3 cm.

Also of interest is the integral walking robot with supervisor control shown in this section. It has three laser distance measurers. The operator can alter the rate of its movement, adjust the length of the step, the height over the surface and so forth. In glancing cautiously and carefully examining the surrounding space, this robot crosses obstacles and one involuntarily wonders: "just how enticing are the prospects of improving man's automatic assistants. They have already mastered the first steps of a steep stairway on their path. Now there are tens of thousands of them and tomorrow there will be scores more."

Timely, pertinent and useful--this probably is the most accurate description of what we saw at the exhibit. The creative developments of the designers and engineers shown at it possess one other important property--effective practical use. Some of the displays shown at the exhibit are already in use in the five-year plan and others soon will arrive at the plants and factories and take up their proper place in the work line.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

MATERIALS FOR AGITATION ON ROCKET FORCES, ARTILLERY DAY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 83 pp 32-36

[Unattributed article: "On Guard for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People; Materials for Reports and Talks on Rocket Forces and Artillery Day"]

[Text] Each year, on 19 November, our nation solemnly celebrates the national holiday of Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. The Soviet people worthily honor the missile troops and artillerymen, the veterans of the Armed Forces and the Great Patriotic War, the scientists and designers, engineers and technicians and defense industry workers--those who develop and operate the powerful missile and artillery weapons.

In the engagements against the Nazi invaders on the fields of the Great Patriotic War, the unprecedented courage and mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers, including the artillery troops, were apparent on an extraordinary scale. In the great battle on the Volga, the 40th anniversary we have celebrated this year, 330,000 Nazi troops were surrounded. In this battle, and primarily in our strong counteroffensive which started on 19 November 1942, the enormous role of the Soviet artillery as the main fire assault force of the Soviet Army was apparent with particular force.

Prior to the start of the offensive, an artillery softening up of the attack was carried out and in the course of this the artillery fire completely disrupted the defensive system of the Nazi troops, it destroyed the enemy staffs, communications centers, command posts and weapons and collapsed the trenches and foxholes. The Nazi troops occupying the defenses suffered significant losses.

In the sector of the main thrust, the Soviet Command was able to create a superiority of more than 10-fold over the enemy in terms of artillery. The artillery offensive in defeating the enemy surrounded at Stalingrad underwent further development. Here for the first time a rolling barrage was widely employed.

To commemorate the combat accomplishments of the artillery troops in fighting the enemy, in 1944, the annual holiday of Artillery Day on 19 November was established by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Since 1964, in accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,

this day has begun to be celebrated as Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. The change in the name of the holiday reflects the profound qualitative changes which have occurred in the USSR Armed Forces during the postwar years. This has been related to the appearance of nuclear missile weapons and their delivery to the Army and Navy and to the establishing of a new Armed Service, the Strategic Rocket Forces.

In continuing the combat traditions of the Soviet military, the missile and artillery troops vigilantly guard the victories of socialism and the peaceful labor of our people. This year they have celebrated their traditional holiday in a situation of the high political and professional upsurge caused by the decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which has outlined the urgent tasks in the present stage of Soviet society's development and outlined practical measures aimed at further raising ideological, indoctrinational and propaganda work to a level of those great and difficult tasks which the party is carrying out in the process of improving developed socialism.

The Soviet people are steadily carrying out the ideas of the 26th CPSU Congress and the decisions of the May, November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee.

Major comprehensive socioeconomic programs are being consistently carried out, including the Food and Energy Programs, production intensification is growing, scientific and technical progress is accelerating and the appearance of enormous regions is changing.

The missile and artillery troops, like all the men of the Armed Forces, are proud of the motherland's accomplishments and vigilantly guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people.

The campaign record of Soviet artillery is inseparable from the heroic history of our fatherland and its Armed Forces founded by the Communist Party. Even in October 1917, the first artillery units and subunits of the Red Army began to be organized.

V. I. Lenin gave great importance to the artillery in carrying out the tasks of defeating the internal counterrevolution and the foreign intervention and in organizing the defense of the revolutionary victories. From the very first days of Soviet power, he showed constant concern for organizing the artillery units and subunits and providing them with command personnel.

By the end of 1918, the Soviet artillery in organizational, technical and personnel terms had become significantly stronger. It had become the main fire force of the Red Army. With artillery support, our army in many operations and battles successfully routed the hordes of White Guards and interventionists. The artillery troops showed examples of courage and tenacity in the fight for Soviet power during the defense of Tsaritsyn and Petrograd, and in defeating Kolchak, Denikin and Vranghel'.

For services to the Soviet republic during the years of the Civil War, 18 artillery units received the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner.

After the victorious end of the Civil War, the Communist Party focused basic attention on the tasks of socialist construction and on the rebuilding and development of the national economy. At the same time, the possibility of new encroachments by imperialists on our motherland demanded significant efforts aimed at further strengthening the defenses of the world's first socialist state.

The increased defense capability of the USSR and the battleworthiness of the army was inseparably linked to the successful implementation of Lenin's plan for industrializing the nation, for the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution. On the basis of the economic and political strengthening of the Soviet state during the first five-year plans, the Communist Party did enormous work to improve the Soviet Armed Forces and arm them with modern combat equipment and weapons. Significant attention was paid to the development of artillery. During the prewar years, 25 new artillery systems of various calibers were developed and these in terms of combat qualities surpassed similar systems in use in foreign armies. There was an accelerated process not only of improving the quality of the artillery systems but also the saturating of the troops with new weapons.

During the years of the prewar five-year plans, Soviet rocket building was born. The outstanding ideas and discoveries linked to the names of K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, N. I. Tikhomirov, F. A. Tsander, B. S. Petropavlovskiy, G. E. Langemak, V. A. Artem'yev, I. T. Kleymenov, S. P. Korolev, M. K. Yangel', V. P. Glushko, G. N. Babakin and many other inventors and innovators have become part of the treasuretrove in the history of Soviet science and missile engineering. Particularly interesting and truly heroic was the work of the workers of the Hydrodynamics Institute who 50 years ago developed the first Soviet rocket with a liquid-fuel engine, the famous "09," the great-grandfather of present-day space rockets.

Under the conditions of the hostile activities by the imperialists aimed against our nation, the accomplishments in the development of missile technology were utilized in the interests of national defense.

An outstanding success of Soviet scientists, designers and workers was the development just before the Great Patriotic War of rocket artillery, the famous "Katyushas." The new weapon--rockets and the BM-8 and BM-13 multirocket launchers--were highly praised by the People's Commissar of Defense, Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko and the People's Commissar of Armaments D. F. Ustinov.

On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Our people led by the Communist Party rose to the defense of their socialist fatherland. The artillery troops fought courageously in the battle formation of the motherland's defenders on all the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Artillery was the mighty force of the ground forces both on the defensive and on the offensive. By its crushing fire, it destroyed enemy tanks, artillery, aviation and personnel, it broke open the defensive lines, it laid the way for the advancing units and in close cooperation with the other branches of troops ensured the success of major engagements.

Combat practice determined the ways for the development and improvement of artillery weapons, the forms of organizing and employing the artillery. In the course of the war, fully automated cannons were developed and their power exceeded by 5-fold the power of similar prewar systems. The 160-mm mortar made its appearance. Antitank artillery became qualitatively different. In no army of the world involved in World War II did rocket artillery become as widely developed as in ours and this reached a high degree of perfection.

In mid-July 1941, a rocket artillery battery under the command of Capt I. A. Flerov made its first destructive attack against the Nazis. The attack was stunning for the enemy and sowed a fear in the Nazis of the new weapon.

The State Defense Committee [GKO], considering the power of a fire strike by rocket weapons, adopted a decision to organize units armed with the BM-8 and BM-13 combat vehicles.

In the course of the war, in terms of the task to be carried out and the requirements of the situation, the structure of the artillery units was improved, tank killing brigades, artillery breakthrough divisions and corps and rocket artillery brigades and divisions were created. An important role was played by the large artillery formations of the Supreme High Command Reserve [RVGK] in forming high artillery densities in the sectors of the main thrusts during strategic operations.

Such qualitative changes in the artillery in the course of the fierce engagements became possible because, in following Lenin's legacy on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the Communist Party turned the nation into a single military camp and directed all the efforts of the Soviet people at creating a powerful, well-organized defense economy. The defense industry during the war years produced hundreds of thousands of artillery pieces of all calibers as well as mortars.

The role and might of the Soviet artillery grew from engagement to engagement and the number of tasks carried out by it increased.

The quantitative growth and the nature of the combat employment of artillery during the years of the Great Patriotic War can be seen from the following example. While in the offensive operations of 1941-1942, there were 40-80 guns and mortars per kilometer of front in the breakthrough sectors, in 1943 the figure was 130-240, in 1944 150-300 and in 1945 250-300 and more.

During the war years, the amount of jet artillery also increased continuously. By 1945, its proportional amount in the RVGK artillery reached 13-14 percent.

The rapid quantitative and qualitative growth of the artillery and the improved forms of its combat employment and art of control required creativity from the artillery command. Many glorious pages in the development of the forms of its combat employment were inscribed by M. I. Nedelin, V. I. Kazakov, G. S. Kariofilli, N. S. Fomin, N. M. Khlebnikov and others.

The artillery troops effectively utilized the combat weapons created by the labor of the Soviet people. They demonstrated the highest skill and miracles of heroism.

In this year the Soviet people celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Kursk Battle where the strategic initiative was once and for all taken away from the enemy. In the battle on the Kursk Salient, the Soviet artillery troops covered themselves with undying glory. The "God of War" began his work here with powerful artillery counterpreparation against the formations of the Nazi army which were prepared for a rush, holding up its offensive by 2.5-3 hours.

The artillery troops from the battery of Lt S. I. Rodionov fought courageously. In combating Nazi tanks and infantry, they in a single day destroyed 29 enemy tanks and up to 2 enemy infantry battalions. The battery commander, Lt. S. I. Rodionov and 4 of his soldiers--M. I. Abdullin, V. K. Lovchev, I. t. Pimonov and F. G. Reznik--for this feat were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In this great battle there were many similar examples of courage and heroism.

Having bled the enemy white in the defensive battles, the Soviet troops went over to a counteroffensive. The crushing defeat for the grouping of Nazi troops on the Kursk Salient was one of the crucial events in the Great Patriotic War. In the course of the Kursk Battle, the enemy lost around 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and more than 3,700 aircraft.

Nazi Germany was no longer able to fully replace these losses. The Battle of Kursk confronted the Nazi Army with a catastrophe.

In brilliantly conducting a number of major strategic operations, the Soviet Armed Forces completely cleared the homeland of Nazi invaders, they liberated the European peoples from the suppression of the Nazi occupiers and in the great Berlin Battle completed the defeat of the Nazi troops.

Our nation won a world historical victory in a duel of unprecedented scope and intensity against the aggressor. The main creator of this was the Soviet people and the inspirer and organizer was the Communist Party.

The Soviet artillery troops made a worthy contribution to achieving victory over the enemy. Their military valor and heroism were highly praised by the motherland. Over 500 of the most outstanding artillery units and formations received the high title of guards, around 800 regiments, brigades and divisions received orders and many of them obtained honorary names. More than 1.6 million artillery troops received orders and medals, over 1,800 men were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the artillerymen V. Petrov and A. Shilin received this title twice.

Among the artillery Heroes of the Soviet Union were the commander of the fire platoon Guards Lt G. Pechkovskiy, the battery commander Guards Lt V. Burdasov, the battalion commander Capt B. Khigrin, the gun commander Sr Sgt N. Kolesnikov, the gun commander Sr Sgt S. Kosterin, the gun commander Sr Sgt A. Lutsevich, the battery commander Guards Capt I. Novozhenov and the commander of the artillery reconnaissance squad, Guards Pfc N. Mokryy. All of them and many other courageous men by orders of the USSR minister of defense have been entered in perpetuity on the personnel rolls of the missile and artillery units.

After World War II, there were the urgent problems of further improving our Army and Navy. It was essential to determine the basic directions for the development of weaponry and combat equipment and the ratio of the Armed Services and branches of troops considering the experience of the previous war and the capability of the economy. This was necessitated by the tension in the international situation. The U.S. ruling circles, in striving for world domination, overtly began to conduct an aggressive policy of "from a position of strength." This policy was based upon the monopolistic possession of nuclear weapons. The doctrine of "massive nuclear retaliation" was elaborated and this envisaged the "right" of the United States to make a nuclear strike against the socialist states, first of all against the Soviet Union, at a moment when the United States felt this necessary.

Having realistically assessed the danger of the aggressive aspirations of international imperialism, the Communist Party and the Soviet government under economically difficult conditions of the first postwar years were forced to rapidly reorganize the defense industry and broadly develop scientific research in the area of missile building and the production of atomic ammunition.

By the mid-1950's, the problem of developing nuclear missile weapons had basically been solved.

However, at that time the rocket weapons did not fully meet the demands of hitting targets at significant distances from Soviet territory. The year 1957 became an important turning point in the development of rocket building as at that time our nation successfully tested an intercontinental multistage ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to any point of the world. The military invulnerability of the United States--the main bulwark of imperialism--was ended.

On 7 November 1957, at the parade honoring the 40th anniversary of Great October, strategic rocket subunits participated for the first time. Earlier, on 4 October 1957, a powerful Soviet carrier rocket for the first time in mankind's history orbited an artificial earth satellite. A crushing blow was delivered to the myth of bourgeois propaganda on the scientific and technical backwardness of the Soviet Union.

By the end of the 1950's, the aggressive intrigues of imperialism had become significantly more active. The monopolistic circles of the West endeavored to check the on-going development of socialism and the revolutionary and national liberation movements. The imperialists endeavored to find a way out in preparing to unleash a new war. The main bet was on the development of new types of nuclear ammunition, increasing the delivery systems, developing a broad network of military bases around the socialist countries and concluding aggressive military-political groupings and blocs.

Under these conditions the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government were forced to take the appropriate measures to strengthen our motherland's defense might, to make changes in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and increase their combat capability and readiness.

In 1959, the party Central Committee and the Soviet government adopted a decision on establishing a new Armed Service, the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The Rocket Forces received the best personnel capable of quickly mastering the new weapons. Thousands of experienced generals and officers who had participated in the Great Patriotic War arrived in these troops. These included the prominent military leaders M. I. Nedelin, S. S. Biryuzov, N. I. Krylov and many other remarkable commanders, political workers and missile specialists.

Next year, the Strategic Rocket Troops will celebrate their 25th anniversary. Over this time they have been significantly improved. The necessity of this has been dictated by the difficult international situation and by the unrestrained arms race by the imperialist forces, primarily the United States.

Due to the fault of imperialism, in recent years, the danger of a new world war has grown sharply. Considering this, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have made a titanic effort to dispell the threat hanging over mankind and to achieve a fundamental improvement in international relations. "...The question of maintaining peace in the world," emphasized Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in his speech at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "is today and will be in the foreseeable future the key problem of our party's foreign policy."

However, the United States does not want to listen to the voice of good will, it actually sabotages any talks with the USSR and wants to force our nation into unilateral disarmament in order to achieve military superiority. The intention of the United States to deploy medium-range missiles in Western Europe represents a particular threat to the USSR and its allies.

The Soviet military are vigilantly watching the intrigues of the aggressors. In struggling to preserve peace, emphasized the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the Communist Party and the Soviet government in the future will do everything necessary to ensure the security of the USSR, its friends and allies and to increase the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, a mighty factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist reaction.

In warmly approving and wholly supporting the Leninist foreign and domestic policy of our party, the Soviet rocket and artillery troops, like all the personnel of the Armed Forces, by their unstinting labor are making a worthy contribution to increasing the combat readiness of the troops. Among the missile officers, over 90 percent are high-class specialists and true masters of military affairs. Day by day the skill of the rocket and artillery troops grows and there are more and more outstanding men in training. Many units and subunits rightly bear the honorary title of outstanding. The socialist competition under the motto "Raise Vigilance and Dependably Ensure the Security of the Motherland!" is aimed at increasing the results of military and political training.

In the vanguard of the socialist competition in the Rocket Forces is the personnel of the unit under the command of Officer A. Pavlov. This troop collective

for 5 years running has had the title of outstanding. Here 60 percent of the subunits and 55 percent of the crews are outstanding.

The rocket troops and the artillery of the Ground Forces have undergone further development at the present stage. They also now remain a powerful means of hitting the enemy on the battlefield. Inherent to them are high mobility, maneuverability and high accuracy of hitting the targets.

At present, the Strategic Rocket Troops are the most important component of the Soviet Armed Forces. They are equipped with the most modern missile complexes with high tactical, technical and operational specifications. These missiles are capable of rapidly and dependably delivering powerful nuclear charges to the target and make inevitable strikes against the aggressor wherever he might be. The Rocket Forces are constantly in combat readiness. In peacetime as well they carry out a task of state importance and constantly stand alert duty, defending the creative labor of the Soviet people.

The going on alert duty for all the rocket troops is a great and responsible event. It is marked by a special ritual. In precise formation under the Great Colors the rocket troops hear the combat order: "For ensuring the security of our motherland, the USSR, take up alert duty!" Their will, thoughts and actions are aimed at carrying out the set mission at any instant.

All ideological, party political work in the troops is subordinate to mobilizing the men for exemplary and vigilant standing of alert duty.

Increased combat skill was shown by the personnel of many artillery and rocket units and subunits of the Ground Forces in the summer of 1983 in the course of the exercises in the Baltic. The tasks of the exercises were carried out skillfully and with great effectiveness in the units where Officers I. Ravlyuk, M. Borzenkov, A. Korbachkov and others serve.

High and steady results in combat training have also been demonstrated by the personnel of the units where Officers P. Ryakhovskiy, A. Korniyenko, O. Laptev and Yu. Gorskiy serve.

The role of the party organizations is increasing in carrying out responsible tasks of combat readiness, military and political training. They are active in the very thick of the mass of servicemen, they are the political nucleus of the troop collectives, by all their work they help to carry out the party policy in the Armed Forces and ensure unflagging attention to all aspects of troop life and combat service.

The Komsomol organizations are carrying out the tasks of the communist indoctrination of the army youth actively and purposefully, in accord with the demands of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Fifth Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee.

The party and Komsomol organizations are making certain that the communists and Komsomol members set an example in carrying out military duty. They are in the vanguard of the struggle for high combat readiness and strong military discipline and they mobilize the men to successfully carry out training tasks.

The rocket and artillery troops, like all the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, are closely rallied around the Communist Party, they are totally dedicated to the high ideals of communism and in a single combat formation with the men of the Warsaw Pact armies vigilantly guard the creative labor of the Soviet people and the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

GREATER RELIANCE, TRAINING FOR NCO PERSONNEL RECOMMENDED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 83 pp 43-47

[Article by Guards Lt Col V. Bulgakov, tank regiment commander: "Concern and Attention for the Development of Sergeants"]

[Text] The situation in the tactical exercise developed in such a manner that the tank commander, Guards Jr Sgt M. Molchanov, had to take over for the platoon commander. Having completed a long march, the subunit by the end of the day had reached the assembly area. At dusk, Molchanov assembled the tank troops.

"We are ordered by morning to build shelters and camouflage the equipment," he informed his subordinates of the given mission.

"Well, back to digging," mumbled one of the soldiers discontentedly. "In the morning we are going. Do we have to set up everything?..."

"Enough discussion!" Molchanov interrupted the whimperer. "An order is an order. It is not to be discussed but rather to be carried out...."

The junior commander set to shoveling. And soon in the platoon's position everyone was hard at work. The guardsmen worked silently, steadily, paying no attention to the rain which had started and forgetting the fatigue which had built up over the day. The firm will of the commander and his example of unswerving obedience of an order influenced the men and drove them to steadily surmount the difficulties. The platoon completed the engineer equipping and camouflaging of the tank positions ahead of the stipulated time.

In such an overcoming itself for the sake of carrying out a general task probably contains the essence of conscious military discipline, high responsibility and efficiency of the soldiers and sergeants. This quality is not only a reliable means for carrying out major and minor tasks. It also represents a definite moral position of a soldier as a citizen of the Soviet state and as a builder and defender of a new society.

The personnel of our tank regiment has achieved definite successes in military and political training. During the last training year the guardsmen received the Pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense for Courage and Military Valor. At the end of the winter training period, in inspection exercises and a final

tactical exercise with field firing they again demonstrated ideological maturity, high field skills and military expertise. Virtually all the sergeants in the regiment are among those who completely fulfilled the socialist obligations and added to the ranks of outstanding men in training and high-skilled specialists.

It is hard to overestimate the role of the junior commanders in the life of the troop collectives. "The junior command personnel," pointed out the outstanding Soviet military leader M. V. Frunze, "forms the basis on which the entire cause of discipline, combat cohesiveness and combat preparation of a unit is based. In being constantly among the Red Armymen, the junior command personnel is the sole proponent of all the influences which indoctrinate the unit and all effects from above."

This notion has withstood the testing of time and practice. At present, it is just as timely and instructive, particularly in line with the increased role of small subunits in modern combat. Precisely in a crew, squad or team, under the leadership of sergeants, the men learn to master the powerful combat equipment and weapons, they are formed spiritually and physically and they acquire the skills of disciplined conduct, unfailing efficiency and aware subordination to proper procedures. The junior commanders play a special role in ensuring the combat teamwork of each troop collective.

The subunits of our regiment have many highly regarded, demanding and militarily knowledgeable sergeants. The Guards Sgts V. Andrusik, S. Kostrub, Yu. Gridin, O. Mamontov, P. Osipenko and many other junior commanders are a reliable support for the officers in the training and indoctrination of subordinates. They are marked by an activist position in life, a highly developed feeling of responsibility for the affairs of the subunit, an awareness of their official duty and an ability to establish relations with subordinates on the basis of proper exactingness and principledness. Of course, these qualities do not come automatically. They are not issued as an appendix to a sergeant's rank but rather are shaped in the process of military service under the influence of effective indoctrinational work, the traditions existing in the collective and the moral atmosphere.

The command and staff of the regiment, the procedural council, the party and Komsomol organizations are concerned with indoctrinating the sergeants in a spirit of proper exactingness. Their work is planned ahead of time and is coordinated. It starts from the very day when the graduates of the training subunits arrive in the unit.

As experience shows, the shaping up does not occur smoothly and painlessly for all the young sergeants. There is a number of reasons for this. Each person should be turned from an indoctrinee and student into an indoctrinator and teacher. As is known, such conversions do not come about immediately. Moreover, the junior commanders are the same age as their subordinates, they live under the same conditions and the soldiers see their every step. The constant joint service and the common conditions of life help to bring the men together and more rapidly and unnoticeably eliminate that invisible psychological barrier which marks the relationship of a superior and a subordinate from the relations of persons who are equal in service. Nor must one overlook the fact

that at present the junior commanders must work with educated learned young people from whom it is not so easy to win authority and respect. This imposes a particular responsibility on the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations for indoctrinating high moral-combat qualities in the sergeant and for their professional and procedural training.

In our regiment it has become a good tradition for the young sergeants to make their very first steps under the close supervision of experienced officers who teach them the art of indoctrinating their subordinates, who advise how to proceed in one or another instance and help avoid possible errors. This is precisely how things have been organized in the tank battalion under the command of the experienced educator, Guards Lt Col V. Kurzanov. The battalion commander, his deputy for political affairs, Guards Capt A. Dement'yev, the other communist officers and the Komsomol bureau show constant concern for the development of the junior commanders, they talk frequently with the graduates of the training subunits and acquaint them with the regiment's rich traditions.

The battalion regularly conducts exercises with the sergeants on studying the party decisions, the principles of military pedagogics and psychology and the general troop regulations. Close attention is paid to the developing of their commander qualities, and above all their educational skills. For this purpose there are exchanges of experience, demonstration and instructor-procedural exercises and drills. The socialist competition also helps to develop professional activeness of the junior commanders and to strengthen their role in ensuring strong military discipline. In summing up its results, each time it is emphasized that the winners, for example, Guards Jr Sgts M. Molchanov, I. Rachitskiy and A. Matyushonok, in a short period of time achieved successes in service due to personal organization, great exactingness for oneself and one's subordinates and a sense of responsibility for the assigned job.

The battalion under the command of the communist, Guards Lt Col V. Kurzanov, from the results of the winter training period, confirmed the title of outstanding. It would also be possible to mention other troop collectives where, due to the coordinated efforts of the commanders, the political workers and the party organizations, the sergeants are the real advocates of proper order and make a major contribution to ensuring high combat readiness. These are the subunits in which the communist officers P. Geley, A. Khimich, V. Myagkiy and A. Solodovnikov serve as well as other troop collectives. Here the emphasis has been put on instructing the junior commanders in the actual work of strengthening military discipline, establishing proper order by which they mean first of all the exemplary standing of guard and internal duty, the precise organization of military and political training, the operation and up-keep of equipment, proper relationships among servicemen, strict observance of the daily regimen and the rational organization of the personnel's leisure.

In the regiment it has proven effective to hold demonstration exercises with the sergeants on the organizing and standing of duty, competitions for drilling smartness, the maintaining of exemplary order in the barracks and quizzes on a knowledge of the regulations at the end of each training period. The measures conducted up the line of command are combined with active party political work. Here they have lectures by members of the agitation and propaganda groups,

special-subject evenings, meetings with veterans of the war and labor, talks by judge advocates on the questions of legal indoctrination....

From the very first days of the sergeants' service, the commanders and political workers also endeavor to involve them in active social life and in the work of the Komsomol organizations. Many sergeants have been elected to the leading Komsomol bodies and are members of the Komsomol bureaus and committee.

Indicative of the work style in the regiment's Komsomol organization is that it has become a dependable assistant of the commanders and political workers and the party organization in generalizing and disseminating the advanced experience of the best junior commanders. In widely using the wall press and the local radio, the Komsomol activists, for example, have told about the leading commanders of the tank crews and they give the experienced sergeants orders to aid the new men.

Thus, in making a judgment as a whole, in the regiment there is a dependable system for the training and indoctrination of the junior commanders. This is characterized by a combining of the ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination of the sergeants with a better organization of the training process and service as a whole, the creation in the collective of a situation of reciprocal exactingness and demandingness with constant attention and concern for the sergeants. As a result, a predominant majority of the sergeants successfully handle their duties and day by day increase their efforts in military service and in the indoctrinating of subordinates. However, in speaking about the achieved successes, it would not be party-like to close one's eyes to the shortcomings in the work carried out. Unfortunately, these do exist.

It must be admitted that we are still a little concerned for maintaining the authority of the junior commanders in the eyes of their subordinates and there are shortcomings in indoctrinating a feeling of commander dignity in the sergeants. As yet, not all the regiment's officers can swear that they have never dressed down a sergeant in the presence of his subordinates. The subunit commanders in some places are used to issuing orders to the soldiers in skipping their immediate superiors. At the same time, the regulations clearly state that orders are to be given, as a rule, down the line of command. Thus, without intending to do so, we extinguish the initiative of the sergeants and accustom them to unnecessary interference. The party committee and organization do not always properly assess such facts.

Need it be said what harm is done to the training and indoctrination of the sergeants by reducing the demands placed on them on the part of individual officers? Such a situation developed, for example, in the tank company commanded by Guards Capt V. Yermolayev. Here at one time the officers were isolated from their subordinates, they overlooked so-called "minor" infractions and did not publicize them. As a result, a picture of apparent well being was created, the exactingness of the sergeants was reduced and objective information on the life of the soldiers in the barracks was lacking. The point was reached of a major disciplinary infraction by Guards Pvts O. Azakhov and P. Pashuk and their commander, Guards Jr Sgt S. Tsegel'nik, tried to conceal this. Later on in the company they wondered how such a thing could happen. But it turned out that this misdeed by the junior commander was not accidental. On that very evening,

Guards Sr Lt A. Vilkov had been in the subunit. In relying on the junior commander, as he should not have, he turned over the performing of his duties to him and was not interested in what the men were doing or whether they were at their places.

Of course, the unit command corrected the situation in the company of Guards Capt V. Yermolayev. The officers of the regimental staff and members of the party committee did a good deal of work. The battalion party organization also increased the demands for the poor indoctrination of the sergeants. Seemingly, this was the end of it. But there is the disturbing thought: where is the guarantee that something similar will not be repeated in another subunit, at another time? Certainly staff officers and party activists had been in the company of Guards Capt V. Yermolayev previously, but none of them had spotted the alarming symptoms and oversights in the work with the junior commanders. As can be seen, external well being and comparatively stable results in combat training concealed the true state of affairs for senior comrades as well.

I reflected a good deal about this and spoke with the communists from the companies and battalions, with the deputy regimental commander for political affairs and the party committee secretary. Gradually the omissions in the work with the sergeants became more and more apparent even on the regimental scale.

The high authority of a sergeant is based upon a firm foundation of knowledge, convictions and practical affairs. This is indisputable. But what happens if this foundation cracks? Why is there a gap between the word of the junior commander and his conduct? Often this is explained by youthfulness, by a lack of pedagogical experience and reference is made to oversights in the training subunit where they did not teach and we must make up for it.... But is only this the key of the problem? Experience, as is known, is a vital concern. But our sergeants are not without knowledge as many have a higher, specialized secondary education as well as good theoretical and practical training on military questions. Obviously the reason is elsewhere, and namely that we have still not learned to organize the service activities in sergeants in such a manner that it completely and fully meets the letter and spirit of the regulations and that we wrongly consider something in this important matter to be secondary.

For example, we are constantly concerned with improving the ideological and political indoctrination of the junior commanders, we follow their professional training, we carry out a mass of necessary and useful measures on a procedural level but we pay little attention to the practical aspect of their work. How does the sergeant behave or appear when there are no officers nearby? Does he establish proper relation with his subordinates? Does he know how to use the rights granted him? Is he ultimately capable of thinking independently, taking decisions, achieving their unconditional fulfillment by the subordinates or does he need constant prompting? These and other questions are sometimes overlooked by the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol activists. This reduces the effectiveness of our work with the sergeants. And at times our exactingness does not reach them.

For example, take the following detail. We are extremely demanding for the officers who are commanders of companies and platoons for the state of affairs in the subunits and for violations committed by their subordinates. But our

exactingness is far from always extended to the closest mentors of the soldiers and their immediate superiors both through official and party and Komso-mol channels. At the same time, exactingness is the reverse side of responsibility. To whom much has been given from this person, respectively, much is also demanded. The sergeants have been given great rights in relation to their subordinates. According to the regulations they can announce a commendation, a comment, a reprimand or a strict reprimand, they can deprive a soldier of regular leave, assign them out of turn to daily detail and also lift previously imposed disciplinary penalties. In a word, disciplinary practice is a serious tool for the indoctrinational influence of the sergeants on subordinates. But if one examines the service cards of the men, one is immediately struck by the fact that commendations or reprimands have been entered by the company or battalion commander, but seemingly the sergeants never touch the service cards. One wonders who if not the commander of the tank crew, squad or team has a better knowledge of his subordinates, their strong and weak points and could give an objective assessment to the deeds and actions of each of the men? In life this undoubtedly happens basically this way but the fact that the disciplinary practice of the sergeants is not properly reflected in the documents undoubtedly reduces the effectiveness of the measures undertaken by them to maintain proper order in the subunits and weakens the indoctrinational effect of the commendations and reprimands.

Thus, omissions in the work with the junior commanders still exist although against the background of the achieved successes they at times seem non-essential. But it would be wrong to placate oneself with this. Through service and party channels we are taking the necessary measures to eliminate the shortcomings. Indoctrination of the sergeants is not a brief campaign but rather constant, thoughtful and purposeful work, and a constant search for the most effective forms and methods of working with each of them. The subunit officers and the regiment's communists must first of all be the leaders of this search. To rely on the sergeants and to increase the return from their labor means to help to unite the troop collective, to strengthen discipline and organization, to raise combat readiness, to honorably carry out the assumed socialist obligations and at the end of the training year to win the title of outstanding regiment.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

PROGRESS, MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH YEMEN TRACED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 83 pp 82-85

[Article by Capt V. Pozdnyakov: "Defending the Victories of the Republic"]

[Text] The readers of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Officers A. Voronin, A. Yepifantsev, V. Chiger and others, in their letters to the editors have asked for information about how the socialist oriented countries are solving the problem of defending the revolutionary victories and also about their armies. In meeting the request of these comrades, we are publishing an article on the activities of the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] to strengthen the defense capability of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY] which is celebrating on 14 October of this year the 20th anniversary of the anticolonial revolution.

One of the characteristic traits of our times is the growth on the international scene of the Asian, African and Latin American countries which have freed themselves of colonial slavery or semicolonial dependence. In many of them the struggle for national liberation has grown into a struggle against exploiting relations, both feudal and capitalist. The inspired prediction of Lenin's has come true that "in the future crucial battles of the world revolution, the movement of a majority of the population of the world initially aimed at national liberation will turn against capitalism and imperialism..." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 38).

At the present stage, the socialist-oriented countries are in the front ranks of the national liberation movement and they have rejected the capitalist path of development, they are carrying out profound socioeconomic changes and are conducting an anti-imperialist course. In speaking at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out that in the former colonial world these countries are the closest to the socialist states. And they are united with the socialist world not only by common anti-imperialist, peace-loving goals in foreign policy but also by the common ideals of social justice and progress.

The 26th CPSU Congress, having pointed to the increased number of socialist-oriented states, characterized the basic directions of their development.

These are: the gradual elimination of the positions of the imperialist monopolies, the local upper bourgeoisie and feudal lords and the limiting of the activities of foreign capital. These are ensuring the people's states the commanding heights in the economy and the transition to the planned development of the productive forces and the encouraging of the cooperative movement in the countryside. These are the increased role of the working masses in social life and the gradual strengthening of the state apparatus by national personnel loyal to the people. This is also an anti-imperialist nature of the foreign policy of these countries. In them the revolutionary parties are being strengthened and these express the interests of the broad masses of workers.

Precisely such a course is being followed by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) after the winning of national independence in November 1967. This course was given a particularly clear focus after the revolutionary democratic forces came to power in the nation in June 1969.

The period of the independent development of the PDRY has been full of important historical events and accomplishments. However, the main one was the creation in 1978 of the vanguard Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). The aim of the party, the YSP Program states, "consists in the revolutionary transformation of society aimed at completely carrying out the tasks of the national democratic revolution and the transition to the construction of socialism, in being guided in realizing this noble goal by the theory of scientific socialism considering the local features in the development of the national democratic revolution...."

Over the years of independence, the PDRY has achieved numerous successes in establishing the foundations of a new society which is free of the exploitation of man by man. The country has selected a path of socialist orientation. However, the achievements of democratic Yemen in economic, social and cultural development and the progressive policy of the republic have evoked rabid hate and malice from imperialism and the reaction. As was emphasized by the 26th CPSU Congress, the imperialists do not find to their liking the strengthening of the independence of the liberated countries, and they think in the categories of domination and coercion in relation to other states and peoples. American imperialism for the sake of the monopolies has declared the Near East, Africa and the Indian Ocean a sphere of its "vital interests." The U.S. military machine is penetrating actively there and intends to remain for a long time to come.

In increasing their military presence in the area of the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the imperialist powers headed by the United States are creating military bases here, they are concentrating major naval task forces off the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula and are conducting provocative maneuvers by the "Rapid Deployment Forces," for example, "Jade Tiger" or "Bright Star-83." In endeavoring to undermine the revolutionary-democratic power in the PDRY, to intimidate the South Yemen people and disrupt the process of peaceful construction in the nation, the imperialist circles and the Arab reaction have woven a network of anti-governmental conspiracy and send saboteurs and terrorists into the republic's territory. They have repeatedly made attempts to unleash armed aggression against the PDRY.

"In increasing tension in the Near East and in creating bases and deploying fleets in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, the imperialist forces, primarily the American, have set the goal of suppressing the liberation movement of the Arab peoples and imposing on them their rule," stated the General Secretary of the YCP Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and Prime Minister of the PDRY, Ali Nasir Muhammad. "We are opposing these dangerous maneuvers by a course of deepening the progressive changes and strengthening the combat alliance of the PDRY with the world revolutionary movement, primarily with the socialist countries headed by the USSR."

The YSP and the PDRY government have shown great concern for increasing the nation's defense capability and reinforcing its armed forces. A number of sociopolitical and organizational principles for military development have been worked out.

In its military policy, the YSP is guided by the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the defense of the workers' fatherland. As is pointed out in the YSP Program, in the area of strengthening national defense capability, it "proceeds from the thesis of scientific socialism that the force of the revolution is expressed not only in its ability to overthrow the power of the exploiters and establish the revolutionary power of the workers, but also to defend the motherland and its victories and to decisively and promptly thwart the attempts by the imperialist and reactionary forces to restore the rule of the exploiters."

It is up to the armed forces of the PDRY above all to carry out these tasks. By their social nature they have a popular, progressive nature. Article 10 of the republic's Constitution states: "The PDRY never employs its armed forces against the freedom of another people."

The most important sociopolitical principle in the military organizational development, in the opinion of the revolutionary democrats of the PDRY, is party leadership over defense matters. They emphasize that the PDRY Armed Forces can carry out their mission of defending the victories of the workers only under the leadership of the YSP. As was pointed out at the First YSP Congress (1978), the party "directs all the military organizations, it controls them and determines their tasks." The extraordinary YSP Congress held in October 1980 had high regard for the efforts of the party Central Committee, the Political Directorate of the Armed Forces and the army party organizations in increasing the party's leading role in military organizational development.

The South Yemen leaders consider a class approach to be one of the basic sociopolitical principles in the organizational development of the armed forces. They view the army as a weapon of class defense of the national democratic system. The First YSP Congress pointed out that in the course of the revolutionary struggle, the party and the republic's government, in being guided by the theory of scientific socialism, "have turned the military institutions from a weapon of suppressing the people, as they were in the past, into a weapon of defending the victories of the workers. In accord with this principle, the republic's Armed Forces have recruited representatives of the working classes and serve the interests of the workers and peasants. Indoctrination of army personnel is carried out in a spirit of dedication to the working people.

Great work has been carried out by the party and PDRY government, by the command and the political bodies of the Armed Forces in the area of strengthening the unity of army and people. This sociopolitical principle also underlying military organizational development in democratic Yemen has been fully elaborated in the program documents of the PDRY revolutionary democrats. These point to the necessity of ensuring a close link of the military institutions with the worker masses and the actual participation of the armed forces in production activities.

An important principle in the organizational development of the PDRY Armed Forces is the indoctrinating of the personnel in a spirit of internationalism and anti-imperialist solidarity. As was pointed out at the First YSP Congress, the party will continue the international indoctrination of the servicemen. Proceeding from this principle, the leaders of democratic Yemen have developed military-political collaboration with the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. The YSP leadership has emphasized that the Soviet Union played the basic role in strengthening the defense capability of the PDRY. This has given it an opportunity to oppose any danger threatening the tranquility and integrity of the nation.

The military program of the PDRY revolutionary democrats envisages, in accord with its organizational principles, the presence of a regular professional army in the nation. Starting in 1977, the Armed Forces of democratic Yemen have been manned on the basis of a law governing universal military service. Great importance is given to the principle of centralism in organizing the Armed Forces and in directing their activities as well as to strengthening one-man leadership and aware military discipline in them.

The program elaborated by the YSP for military questions is a dependable theoretical basis for carrying out practical activities aimed at strengthening the nation's defense capability and increasing the combat readiness of its armed forces. Of course, the carrying out of the provisions of this program is not a simple matter. However, democratic Yemen is successfully carrying out the tasks related to the defense of the people's revolutionary victories and to creating a new army which fundamentally differs from bourgeois armies.

The strengthening of defense capability in the PDRY is carried out on the basis of the party's theoretical concepts and considering the historical experience of military organizational development in the socialist countries. In developing the economy, the nation has converted to planned methods of national economic management and to the strengthening of the state sector in the economy. At present, the workers of democratic Yemen are at work on carrying out the Second Five-Year Plan for 1981-1985 and this has been coordinated with the plans of the CEMA member nations.

The constant efforts of the YSP and the PDRY government and the republic's working class have led to definite shifts in industry. The nation has already over 50 large enterprises of the state sector and 34 power plants. Significant successes have also been achieved in agriculture. Here the state-cooperative sector is being strengthened, MTS [machine-tractor station] are being created and new lands are being developed. The socialist countries are providing the PDRY with great aid in training highly skilled scientific and technical personnel.

As a whole, democratic Yemen has achieved significant results and taken a noticeable step forward in building a new society and in strengthening defense capability. Of course, the young republic is encountering many difficulties on the path of economic development and this is explained by its colonial past and the related insufficient development of the physical plant, the limited material and financial opportunities and the shortage of trained personnel. Nevertheless, as was pointed out by A. N. Muhammad, due to the transformations in the economy, the nation has acquired the ability to defend its security.

The leadership of democratic Yemen has constantly emphasized that the armed defense of the revolution is carried out through the purposeful activities of people. Consequently, in order to successfully defend the revolutionary victories, it is essential to have not only the material prerequisites but also the high moral-political potential which, when necessary, is turned into decisiveness and the tenacity of the masses of people when confronted by a danger threatening the motherland. In this regard, the PDRY has done great work to indoctrinate the workers in a spirit of patriotism, loyalty to the party cause, in a spirit of anti-imperialist solidarity, hate for the aggressors and a readiness to devote all forces, and if need be, life itself to the cause of defending the fatherland. This is important because the morale of the army is inseparably linked to the morale of the people.

The question of the strengthening of the armed forces and improving their organizational structure is of major importance in the activity of the PDRY revolutionary democrats in increasing the nation's defense capability. At present, the PDRY Armed Forces include ground forces, air forces and air defense troops as well as naval forces.

In being concerned with strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces, the republic's leadership has given unflagging attention to arming them with modern types of weapons and combat equipment. They are armed with modern fire arms, tanks, artillery, mortars, antiaircraft missile complexes, fighters and fighter-bombers, missile and torpedo boats. The training system is being constantly improved for officer, NCO and rank-and-file personnel. The republic's only military school has become a true forge of officer personnel. Of the total number of officers in the nation's armed forces who have completed the national military training institutions, 90 percent are graduates from this school. The navy technical school, the artillery military school, the armored troops school and others are successfully training officer and NCO personnel.

In line with the necessity of increasing the army's combat readiness, the delivery of new, more advanced types of combat equipment to it and the greater complexity of military affairs as a whole, the demands placed on the training level of the servicemen have been constantly rising. In the PDRY Armed Forces great importance is paid to combat training and to increasing the combat skills of the troops. Here the main goal of carrying out combat work in the army is to teach the personnel to skillfully and efficiently employ the weapons and combat equipment under the conditions of modern warfare. The men of the PDRY Armed Forces master combat skills in the course of daily training, including field exercises, tactical drills and military maneuvers.

The YSP has carried out a whole series of effective measures to increase the party's leading role in the Armed Forces and for strengthening the political and ideological tempering of the servicemen. In 1979, in accord with the decisions of the Sixth Plenum of the YSP Central Committee, a new system of party political work was introduced into the Armed Forces and the army party and political apparatus was reorganized. As a result the Political Directorate of the PDRY Armed Forces became the guiding party body carrying out the YSP policy in the army. On the basis of the decisions of the June (1980) Plenum of the YSP Central Committee, in the Armed Services, branches of troops, brigades and units, political sections were set up and directives of the YSP Central Committee were issued on the work of the party organizations in the Armed Forces and the party commissions under the political sections.

After the formation of the YSP, party political work was significantly strengthened in the PDRY armed forces. This has been carried out in accord with the YSP developmental principles and based upon the decisions of the party congresses, the plenums of the YSP Central Committee and other party documents as well as the orders of the republic minister of defense and the chief of the Political Directorate of the PDRY Armed Forces. Party political work as a whole is subordinate to indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of total loyalty to the party and the people and a constant readiness to repel any aggression.

In the course of improving party political work in the troops, various forms and methods of conducting this work were developed. Thus, a broad network of party study was established for the YSP members and candidate members, political exercises were organized for the personnel, and a unified political day was introduced. The Armed Forces published the journal AL JUNDIY ("The Soldier") and the army newspaper AR RAYA ("Banner"). A military museum, cultural centers, officer and soldier clubs have been opened. The units have their rooms of combat glory and libraries. The song and dance ensemble of the Armed Forces and a music ensemble are very popular.

A special role in defending the revolutionary victories is played by the people's militia, armed formations of workers, peasants, student youth, revolutionary intelligentsia and white collar personnel. This serves as a dependable reserve and assistant of the Armed Forces. The people's militia detachments have proved effective in the struggle against counterrevolution and in repelling armed attacks on the republic.

Since May 1973, the nation has had another mass organization which supports revolutionary order, the people's defense committees. These are organized along territorial lines. One of the basic tasks of the committees is to stand duty at night at the place of residence and protect important installations and state enterprises.

In strengthening the nation's defense capability, the PDRY revolutionary democrats have developed military-political collaboration with the Soviet Union. On 25 October 1979, a Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration was signed between the USSR and the PDRY for a period of 20 years. In particular, it states that the parties in the future will act in defense of peace throughout the world, including in the Near East, for deepening detente, for creating an

effective security system in Asia, for settling international problems by peaceful means and for disarmament; the determination of the two parties is confirmed to wage an active struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and for finally eliminating colonialism and racism in all their forms. The treaty provides for consultation on international questions directly touching on the interests of both countries.

An important point in the treaty is the obligations of the parties not to participate in alliances, actions or measures aimed at the other one. It is also envisaged that collaboration will be developed in the military area along with the strengthening and broadening of economic, scientific-technical and other ties between the two states.

In the course of an official friendly visit in September 1982 to the USSR by Comrade Ali Nasir Muhammad, the USSR and the PDRY noted with satisfaction the ongoing development and strengthening of relations between the two countries. They confirmed their determination to further prove bilateral collaboration in all areas.

"Any revolution is only worth something if it can defend itself...." These words of V. I. Lenin who anticipated the liberation of the Eastern peoples from national and colonial suppression involuntarily come to mind near the monument to the leader of the Russian revolution in Aden and unveiled for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Symbolically, the monument, the first on the Arabian Peninsula, was unveiled on the territory of the military school. During days of the USSR and PDRY state holidays, the future commanders and political workers come here and lay flowers at the foot.

The successes of democratic Yemen are apparent in all areas. Although one can still feel the burden of almost 130 years of colonial suppression, the nation's workers under the leadership of the YSP are confidently continuing to follow the path of socialist transformations. The fruitful theoretical and practical activities of the YSP ensure the strengthening of the republic's defense capability and create favorable conditions for peaceful construction in democratic Yemen.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

TEXTBOOK REVIEWED ON PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 83 pp 86-87

[Review by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Col A. Dmitriyev of the textbook "Marksistsko-leninskaya filosofiya i metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki" (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice) under the general editorship of N. D. Tabunov and V. A. Bokarev, Voenizdat, 1982, 406 pages, 1 ruble, 30 kopecks]

[Text] A new textbook has been published on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the methodological problems of military theory and practice [the book reviewed here]. Its content makes it possible to say that the reader has gained a necessary and useful book.

It must be pointed out that this is the first textbook worked out specially for students in the command and engineer military academies in accord with the program under which they study Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the philosophical problems of military theory and practice. In preparing the text, consideration has been given to the experience of teaching in VUZes, and the lectures and materials from the internal publications of a number of academies have been creatively employed.

The authors have not set out to examine all questions equally. Only the most important and complex which are of particular significance for the military specialist have been isolated and analyzed. These questions are explained profoundly but at the same time as tersely and concretely as possible, considering the interests of the Army and Navy audience. The authors do not avoid debated aspects and frequently use materials from monographs and special articles as well as the results of scientific symposiums. Everything set forward is based on a solid foundation of the heritage of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the party and state documents as well as the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and the plenums of our party's Central Committee. The works of Soviet military chiefs and scientists have been widely used.

The introduction describes the subject, structure and functions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as well as the basic stages of its establishment and development. Here a new feature is the incorporation in the textbook of individual chapters devoted to such philosophical works of V. I. Lenin as "Materialism and Empirical Criticism" and the "Philosophical Notebooks." These chapters

provide a terse description of the basic ideas of Lenin's work and bring out their historical significance for modern times and for various areas of science and practice.

The first part of the textbook is devoted to the problems of dialectical materialism, that is, the teachings about matter and conscience, the laws, categories and principles of dialectics. Here the essence of the problems to be studied is stated, but chief attention is focused on showing the methodological importance of the basic provisions of dialectical materialism for military affairs.

The contents of the given part of the book has been stated interestingly and creatively. Certain new theses have been introduced and these have been taken from special research and not given in the scientific literature hithertofore. Thus, in describing the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, important arguments are given showing its core role as the nucleus of dialectics. It is correctly emphasized that the move from quantitative changes to qualitative ones occurs not only as a result of the accumulating of purely quantitative changes but also as a consequence of the transformation of the structure of objects. In explaining the dialectical law of the negation of the negation, certain specific forms of its manifestation are mentioned.

The new aspects of an applied military nature have been most strongly shown in those chapters which bring out the methodological functions of the basic and nonbasic laws of the dialectics and the contents of its fundamental principles. The military reader will be interested in learning the theoretical concepts about the importance of the Marxist-Leninist notion of the material unity of the world for solving simulation problems in the area of military technology, military art and other phenomena.

The second part of the book explains the essence of the materialistic understanding of history and the greatness of the scientific feat of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin who put an ordered and integral social theory in the place of the chaos and arbitrariness in an understanding of the historical process. Here basic attention has been paid to a description of historical materialism as a scientific theory, a most important element of the communist ideology and as a methodology of social sciences and revolutionary practice. The importance of historical materialism has also been soundly shown for an analysis of the fundamental problems of war, the army and military science.

Very interesting is the material on the relationship of nature and society and on the socioecological problems of the modern world. The book convincingly shows the decisive role of material production in the life of society and in the development of military affairs. At the same time the role of natural-geographic conditions and natural resources is rightly emphasized for the strengthening of a state's military might.

Considering the particular features of the basic contingent of readers, the textbook includes a chapter on the present-day scientific and technical revolution and its impact on military affairs. The chapter brings out the most important traits of the scientific and technical revolution, it shows the opposite nature of its effect on social processes in the capitalist and social

countries and establishes the particular features of its manifestation in various areas of military affairs. Considering the needs of military practice, the problems of the development of social conscience have been set out, the nature and forms of the present-day ideological struggle have been analyzed and a convincing criticism has been provided of the bourgeois and revisionistic sociological theories as well as the methodological bases of bourgeois military science.

The third part of the textbook encompasses the general problems of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army. This is one of the most ordered, thoroughly worked out and interesting parts of the book. Here particular attention should be given to the material disclosing the relationship of war and politics, the basic types, sorts and varieties of modern wars, the system of the laws of warfare and armed combat and the principles of military art.

The authors creatively approach a treatment of these problems and provide a sufficiently ordered typology of the wars and armies of the modern era as well as the patterns of their development. Attention should be given to an analysis of the structure of a state's military might, the ratio of potential and real military might and the dynamics of its realization in the course of a war. The ratio of objective laws, the laws of military theory and the ensuing principles of military organizational development is correctly shown.

The chapters in the concluding part of the book are devoted to the most urgent methodological problems of military theory and practice. These are closely linked to the materials of the preceding section but with validity have still been made into an independent group, as they go beyond the limits of a philosophical and sociological examination of war and the army.

The problem of the relationship of man and technology in a war and in the development of military affairs is one of the most acute problems under the conditions of the present-day scientific and technical revolution. The textbook rightly emphasizes the crucial role of man in creating and effectively utilizing the evermore complex military equipment. For the Army and Navy specialist, of particular interest is the material showing the development dialectics of the forms and methods of armed combat as well as the logic, the methods of practical and scientific understanding of military phenomena and the questions of scientific prediction and creativity in military affairs.

The textbook ends with a chapter on the methodological basis of scientific management of the troops and naval forces. This analyzes the essence of scientific management and the content of management activity. Here a special accent has been put on the social aspects of management and on the ways and means of further developing the troop management systems and methods.

Of course, as in any major work, not everything in this textbook has been equally successful. Inherent to it are individual shortcomings both in content and in the form of stating the material. First of all, it might be pointed out that not all the paragraphs have been worked out with equal thoroughness in theoretical terms. In individual chapters the material has been given in a somewhat complicated manner and not always reinforced by convincing examples.

The absence in a textbook of a special section devoted to the fundamental problems of the theory of cognition and Lenin's theory of reflection can scarcely be considered a merit in a philosophy textbook. In truth, such material does exist in the text but it is scattered and given in fragments. Certain theoretical concepts have not been formulated with complete clarity. In the chapter dealing with modern problems of the philosophical teachings concerning cognition, the problem of self-awareness has been disproportionately represented, while not enough has been said of the methodological importance of the category of "conscience" for military theory and practice. It is hard to consider as valid the assertion that "a spiral the twists of which become wider and wider as they move away from the initial cycle" is a form for the manifestation of dialectical negation. At times there is an excessive infatuation with the "inventing" of various principles. At the same time, the essence of the materialistic understanding of history has not been brought out with sufficient completeness.

However, these shortcomings are of a particular sort and do not reduce the important achievements of the given text. Undoubtedly it will provide theoretical and procedural aid to the students of military academies and to all officers studying Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

MILITARY JOURNALS REPLY TO CRITICISM IN INDOCTRINATIONAL WORK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 83 p 96

[Unattributed follow-up on journal actions. For original article see JPRS 84449, No 1800, dated 30 Sep 83 pp 90-96]

[Text] Issue No 10 of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL published under the title "Morally Tempering the Youth" a review of the military journals and devoted to the questions of the treatment of the moral indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel. It pointed out that on the pages of the reviewed publications--SOVETSKIY VOIN, AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA and ZNAMENOSETS--a number of essays, analytical, problem articles and letters had appeared disclosing the experience of the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations in forming high moral qualities in the men. Along with this the review pointed to a number of unresolved problems and reserves the use of which by the military journals could significantly strengthen the effectiveness of their writings on the given problem.

KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL received a reply from the editor-in-chief of the journal ZNAMENOSETS, Col A. Koval'. In this he stated that the published review "Morally Tempering the Youth" was studied and discussed by the editorial board of the journal and it became a subject of a major discussion at a party meeting. The criticism directed at ZNAMENOSETS was recognized as valid. The editorial board has worked out a plan for eliminating the shortcomings pointed out in the review. The problems of the moral tempering of the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], sergeants and petty officers of the Army and Navy will be constantly raised on the pages of ZNAMENOSETS. Measures are being taken to further improve the quality of the published materials.

A reply has also been obtained over the signature of the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN, Col A. Danilov. The review, it states, was discussed at a session of the bureau of the journal's primary party organization, at a meeting of the editorial staff and at a session of the editorial board. The assessment of the work by the collective of SOVETSKIY VOIN on treating the questions of the moral indoctrination of the youth on the journal's pages was considered just. Measures are being taken to further improve the content and quality of the essays, articles and letters published in SOVETSKIY VOIN. The problems of the moral indoctrination of the youth will be widely taken up in the next issues of the journal and diverse sorts of articles

on these subjects are planned in the long-range plan for the basic publications of SOVETSKIY VOIN for 1984-1985.

The deputy editor-in-chief of the journal AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA, Col G. Rodin, has stated that the criticism contained in the review has been recognized as valid. A thorough discussion of the critical comments was held at a party meeting and in an editorial unannounced meeting. As a result, the traditional heading "On the Subjects of Moral Indoctrination" has been revived and a new section "Traits of the Soviet Way of Life" has been introduced. A special subject plan has been drawn up for materials on the problems of the moral conditioning of the troops.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH HONORS USTINOV'S 75TH BIRTHDAY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 83 pp 9-13

[Unattributed biographical sketch of D. F. Ustinov: "In the Name of the Fatherland's Might and Security: The 75th Anniversary of Mar St' D. F. Ustinov"]

[Text] Soldiers of the Lenin guard.... This is how we describe those who, headed by V. I. Lenin, raised our country's working people to resolutely storm the Old World, the world of exploitation and oppression, of injustice and violence, of wars of conquest. This is also how we describe those who took the baton of socialist construction directly from the hands of the Communists from the Lenin guard, worthily carried it through the years of the first five-year plans, through the harsh trials of the Great Patriotic War, and through the difficult postwar period, and honorably continue to carry it further, devoting their knowledge and vast experience to active activity and all their strength and energy to the successful solution of the tasks of communist building. One of those heroic people is Mar SU Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, prominent figure of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR defense minister, whose 75th birthday falls on 30 October.

Son of a Samara worker and himself a worker, Dmitriy Ustinov, having absorbed the best qualities of his heroic class--staunchness, organization, loyalty to revolutionary duty--already in his teenage years played an active part in the working people's struggle for the new system's victory. At the age of 14 he volunteered to join the Red Army. Dmitriy Ustinov was admitted to the Komsomol there. After his army service he attended a vocational and technical school and worked as a metal worker. In 1927, the young worker became a Communist.

Those were times when the party had firmly embarked on a course of implementing the Leninist plan for the building of socialism in the USSR. Under its wise leadership, the Soviet people successfully resolved the most important and most complex task of the socialist revolution--the task of construction. This task was further complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union's advance along the path of socialism was taking place under tense international conditions. The Communist Party and the Soviet government clearly saw the growing danger of war and took the necessary measures to consolidate the country's defense capability. The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), held in December 1927, emphasized the need to develop those branches of industry which would determine to a large extent the ensuring of the country's defense and economic

stability in wartime. In order to accomplish this task the national economy urgently needed cadres of highly trained specialists.

D. F. Ustinov was among those who answered the party's call and left the lathe and the plow for the lecture hall. In 1934, he successfully graduated from the Leningrad Military Engineering Institute and was posted to the Naval Artillery Scientific Research Institute. Scientific work appealed to the young engineer. Dmitriy Fedorovich's talent as a designer developed in labor, in the joys of creative victories, in the struggle with difficulties. At the same time, he was interested in questions of production organization and the practical transformation of ideas into real specimens of improved equipment. This was the clinching argument for D. F. Ustinov's appointment as chief of the operation and experimental works bureau in one of Leningrad's largest plants.

Independent creative work increasingly demonstrated D. F. Ustinov's qualities not only as an innovator and designer but also as a skilled production organizer. He soon became deputy to the plant's chief designer, and in 1938 was appointed director of the fatherland's industrial giant, the Bolshevik Plant.

As leader of a large labor collective, Dmitriy Fedorovich was distinguished by realism, thorough consideration of existing opportunities, breadth of thought and ability to look ahead. All the basic production processes were within his field of vision. Possessing wide knowledge, a vast capacity for work, and exceptional memory, he was quick to analyze the situation and made the most appropriate decisions. In the spring of 1939, the Bolshevik Plant was awarded the Order of Lenin. The motherland's supreme award was also presented to its director.

Plant veterans who worked there in the prewar years no doubt recall how Dmitriy Fedorovich, with his inexhaustible energy, professionalism, and purposefulness, rallied the thousands-strong workers collective and inspired it to new achievements, how he frequently consulted the old cadre workers, experienced technicians and engineers, listened sympathetically to their proposals, supported things that were new and progressive, himself put forth organizational and technical initiatives, and brilliantly implemented them.

D. F. Ustinov's political and organizational abilities were manifested especially vividly in the responsible post of USSR people's commissar for armaments. Those were times when a deadly threat hung over the country--the threat of fascist invasion. The People's Commissariat for Armaments actively resolved questions of organizing the design, tests, and production of field, naval, anti-tank, and antiaircraft artillery, cannon and machine-gun armaments for the air force, all types of tank weapons and small arms, optical instruments and bullets. Truly enormous tasks were placed on the shoulders of the 32-year-old people's commissar.

The size of those tasks increased considerably after Nazi Germany's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. It was necessary to sharply increase the output of howitzers, antiaircraft guns, antitank weapons, tank cannon, small arms and bullets. This is why the plants began work within only 3 or 4 weeks after their evacuation to the east, at times even setting up their equipment in the open air.

D. F. Ustinov was personally in charge of the evacuation of enterprises and the organization of military supplies production. Thanks to the precise organization and cooperation of all components and subdivisions of the People's Commissariat and to the heroic labor of armaments workers, by the second half of 1941 the front was supplied with more than 1.6 million rifles and carbines, 106,700 machine-guns (excluding the 89,700 submachine-guns that were delivered) and 9,900 artillery guns, some of them 76-mm and larger in caliber.

The People's Commissariat for Armaments headed by D. F. Ustinov was, of course, behind all this. Mar Art N. D. Yakovlev, chief of the Main Artillery Directorate at the time, recalled: "I don't know when he slept, but I got the impression that Dmitriy Fedorovich was always on his feet. He was distinguished by invariable good spirit and the greatest of kindness for people. As people's commissar for armaments, D. F. Ustinov showed himself to be an excellent engineer, skilled expert, and capable production organizer. He was in favor of fast and daring solutions and thoroughly understood the most complicated technical problems. And with all this, he did not for a moment lose his human qualities."

In 1942, D. F. Ustinov was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general of engineering and technical forces. In the same year he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for outstanding services in the organization of production, the development of new types of artillery and small arms, and the skillful leadership of plants. In 1944, People's Commissar for Armaments D. F. Ustinov was awarded the military rank of colonel general of engineering and technical services.

During the war the enterprises of the People's Commissariat for Armaments produced quantities of all types of artillery and small arms which fully met the requirements of the armed forces for the successful conduct of operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and for scoring victory in it. This quantity was double what was produced by Nazi Germany's industry. Furthermore, about three-fourths of artillery system types and approaching half of small arms types, qualitatively superior to the Nazi ones, were developed and put into mass production during the war.

The armaments industry wrote a brilliant page in the Soviet people's great feat. The engineering and technical cadres of the plants under the People's Commissariat for Armaments raised during the years of Soviet power and educated by the Communist Party honorably withstood all the trials of war and were tempered in the struggle against hardships.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people returned to peaceful labor. The prime necessity was to rebuild the national economy in the areas which had suffered from the invasion by the German fascist hordes, further develop the socialist national economy, and render assistance within our power to the young people's democracies. The party's domestic and foreign policy was subordinated to the solution of these tasks. At the same time, taking into account imperialism's aggressive intrigues, its atomic blackmail, and the launching of the "cold war" against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the CPSU took radical measures to further consolidate the Soviet Armed Forces and supply them with the latest combat equipment, including nuclear missiles weapons.

As minister of armaments and then USSR minister of the defense industry ministry, deputy and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the Supreme USSR National Economic Council under the USSR Council of Ministers, D. F. Ustinov coordinated and directed the work of scientific institutions, design bureaus, and industrial enterprises so as to fulfill to the utmost the party and government targets for the further consolidation of the motherland's economic and defense might.

Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov made an especially great contribution to the development of Soviet missile construction. During those years his office repeatedly became a kind of headquarters where the most important problems of missile construction were resolved and conferences with the most eminent scientists, designers, and specialists from various fields of science, technology, and production were held. D. F. Ustinov was often seen at plants and testing grounds where missile technology was being developed and tested. In his speech at the 21st CPSU Congress he noted that, in order to develop our own armaments, it had been necessary to comprehensively resolve the most difficult problems and tasks in the sphere of the design, technology, and organization of the production of new materials, many complicated precision instruments, and all kinds of ground equipment. In particular, we developed the production of powerful rocket engines, special fuels for them, heat-resistant materials, computers, and other systems and facilities.

In December 1959, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government made the decision to establish a new branch of the armed forces--the Strategic Missile Forces. Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, did a vast amount of fruitful work on the establishment and development of the Missile Force. He systematically visited the testing grounds when weapons were tested, toured missile units and formations where he inquired about the state of affairs regarding the personnel's combat and political training, probed all aspects of the troops' life in depth, elucidated the existing difficulties, and took active measures for the fast elimination of shortcomings.

D. F. Ustinov's special services in the development of missile technology and the development and successful launching of the world's first spacecraft, Vostok, with a Soviet citizen on board, were recognized by a second Hammer and Sickle medal of a Hero of Socialist Labor.

For over 10 years, between 1965 and 1976, Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov worked as secretary of our party's Central Committee. While holding this responsible post he manifested with renewed strength the wisdom of a statesman, lofty-mindedness, adherence to principles, and persistence in the implementation of the party's domestic and foreign policy.

In April 1976, the party and the Soviet government entrusted D. F. Ustinov with one of the most militant and responsible sectors of work. He was appointed USSR defense minister.

The USSR Armed Forces today are the armed forces of the state of the whole people. They are a powerful tool for defending the Soviet people's interests and for ensuring the security of our socialist fatherland and the entire socialist community. Thanks to the CPSU's wise Leninist policy in the military

organization sphere, our Army and Navy have at their disposal all the facilities they need to be reliable guards of the Soviet people's peaceful labor and a bulwark of universal peace. This is especially important now, when ultra-reactionary circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie in leading capitalist states are engaged in overt saber-rattling and demonstrating with open cynicism a readiness to set their weapons in motion at any minute.

Under the conditions of the growing war threat, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR defense minister, demands the persistent mastering of modern technology and weapons, improvement of combat skills, and permanent maintenance of an atmosphere in the forces and the fleets ensuring among the soldiers a sense of enhanced vigilance and lofty personal responsibility for the task at hand and for the combat readiness condition of their unit, formation, headquarters, and directorate. Furthermore, the large and complex tasks facing the armed forces can be successfully resolved only as a result of well-organized and purposeful ideological and mass political work.

The contemporary situation and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June (1983) Plenum require the further enhancement of this work's efficiency and quality. "Party political and educational work," D. F. Ustinov emphasizes, "must be passionate and moving and leave a deep impression in people's minds.... Marxism-Leninism has been, is, and will always be a special weapon for our armed forces. We must do everything to ensure that this weapon is always sharp and terrifying for our enemies, that the level of ideological and party political work in the army and the navy corresponds fully to the party's modern requirements!"

Mar SU D. F. Ustinov is distinguished by lofty party-mindedness in his approach to the solution of military organization problems. He pays unflagging attention to the development of military science and the art of war and to the comprehensive improvement of control as the most important element of the armed forces' high combat readiness.

While dealing on a daily basis with the questions of consolidating the combat might of Soviet Armed Forces, D. F. Ustinov simultaneously actively implements the party policy aimed at the preservation of peace and the prevention of nuclear war. In his verbal and printed statements he invariably emphasizes the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine and the noble role played by our Army and Navy as a powerful factor for restraining imperialism's aggressive aspirations.

A profoundly party-minded person, extremely exacting toward himself, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov persistently strives to ensure that military cadres master the Leninist work style, are politically, professionally, and morally impeccable, and nurture a spirit of lofty party-mindedness, adherence to principles, and responsibility within troop collectives.

The further development and strengthening of the friendship and all-round cooperation between the fraternal countries and their peoples and armies are among the matters that are of constant concern for the USSR defense minister. The firmness of our armies' combat alliance--the Warsaw Pact Allied Armed Forces--stems from this friendship and cooperation, which are based upon the

unity of fundamental goals and ideals. In the present complicated international situation Mar SU D. F. Ustinov pays unflagging attention to ensuring that the resolute obstacle in the path of imperialist reaction's aggressive aspirations--the Allied Armed Forces--maintain a high level of combat ability and combat readiness. D. F. Ustinov is well-known for his active participation in conferences of the Warsaw Pact member states' Political Consultative Committee, the work of the committee of fraternal countries' defense ministers, the leadership of joint exercises by allied armies, and other measures serving the cause of strengthening peace and the security of the socialist commonwealth. Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov is engaged in extensive and varied party work. He has been a member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1952. In March 1965, he was elected candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, and in April 1966--candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The CPSU Central Committee plenum held after the 25th Party Congress elected D. F. Ustinov member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. For many years he has served as a USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputy.

D. F. Ustinov's outstanding services to the Communist Party and the Soviet state in strengthening the country's defense during the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar period have been recognized by high awards. He has been awarded the titles of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor (twice), decorated with 10 Orders of Lenin, the Order of Suvorov 1st Class and Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, and presented with many orders from a number of states. D. F. Ustinov is a winner of the Lenin Prize and the USSR State Prize.

Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, loyal son of Lenin's party and the Soviet people, is selflessly serving our socialist motherland and the great cause of communism.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

EFFORTS TO INCREASE ROLE EFFECTIVENESS OF STAFF OFFICERS TRACED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 83 pp 43-48

[Article by Col A. Dobrov, chief of staff of a formation: "A Staff Officer is Not the Recorder of Events"]

[Text] At the concluding stage of a tactical exercise, a tank battalion was crossing a broad water barrier. They safely traveled hundreds of meters across the river bottom and then the first tank, the second and the third emerged from the water.... Suddenly one of the tanks was engulfed in dense smoke. I am certain that it is not difficult to understand the state of those who were officially supervising the course of the crossing. In the difficult situation, the staff officer from the formation, Maj P. Gayda, did not lose his head. In just a few seconds, figuring out the situation, he switched off the smoke release system. Yes, this had been set off in the combat vehicle due to the fault of an excited driver.

Certainly, later the necessary conclusions were drawn on the insufficient moral-psychological and technical training of the tank troops and the necessary measures were taken. But in the given instance I would merely like to point out the precise actions of the communist P. Gayda. In this particular episode Pavel Ivanovich [Gayda] proved himself to be an officer of enviable self-possession, good professional training and great industriousness. He spared neither time nor energy on training the specialists in the subunits, he willingly passed on his knowledge and experience to the officers and instructed them patiently and attentively. When one of the tank subunits had a low percentage of hitting the cannon targets in the final inspection exercises for the winter training period, Maj P. Gayda thoroughly investigated the causes of the poor firing. He was present at the firing range and spoke with the men. In particular, the equipment had been improperly prepared for the exercises. This was a result of oversights in the procedural instructing of the drivers who had not worked enough on the questions of the technical maintenance of the combat vehicles and support for the firing.

The staff officer proposed succinct measures which helped rectify the situation. These were based on progressive educational methods. With his active participation, procedural exercises were conducted with the officer personnel and also a demonstration exercise at which the best specialists demonstrated the procedures for the technical maintenance of the combat vehicles. Visual aids were

prepared reflecting the process of the interaction of the drivers with the tank gunners. The party organization increased the demands placed on the communists for the quality of combat training. All of this helped increase the effectiveness of training.

Let me add that Maj Gayda is the deputy secretary for the party bureau of the primary party organization for the formation's staff and headquarters. Active involvement in the indoctrination of the personnel has become a need for him. The propagandizing of advanced experience and close contact with the men wherever skill is being forged and the ideological tempering of the men strengthened comprise the range of social interests of the communist officer.

The ability to work without fuss, hurry and loud phrases, the ability to spot the future in routine questions and to focus on the main thing are character traits in the work style of many of our officers, including the communists A. Kharitonov, V. Klimenko and P. Khomich. Their influence can be felt in the fact that in a majority of the units and subunits during the current training year, changes for the good occurred, the training plans were successfully carried out, military discipline was strengthened and proper order observed.

A staff officer. Their days are full of many major and minor undertakings. It is scarcely necessary to convince anyone that troop control and command is one of the complex and most dynamic areas of military affairs. The staff is the basic headquarters body which realizes the commander's decisions and will in the organizing of combat training. Within its competence are both planning the activities of the units as well as supervising the implementation of the plans. The staff must ensure the prompt issuing of tasks to the troops, their correct understanding on the spot and verifying the quality of the decisions taken by subordinate commanders and staffs.

The present-day party demands and the instructions of the November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee on improving control and raising discipline and organization oblige us, all the staff officers of the formation and the units, to pay primary significance to improving the style and methods of work. It is essential in every possible way to improve the ties with the units and subunits, to better know the state of affairs on the spot and more effectively undertake measures to eliminate the shortcomings.

Precisely such an approach ensures a competent solution to arising problems. For example, when at the start of the year a lag was noted in the combat and political training of several subunits, the staff worked out recommendations to eliminate these. We thought it advisable to assign the best trained officers to the lagging collectives for systematically aiding their commanders. The party bureau, in turn, recommended that these comrades take a more active part in the political indoctrination in the collective. The communist officers R. Furman, V. Vorob'yev, V. Frish and others made repeated trips to the lagging subunits and worked there not superficially but rather thoroughly, instructing the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and sergeants in the ability to effectively conduct combat training, to organize the competition and instill firm proper order. They conducted talks with the men and spoke at the party and Komsomol meetings. Of course, not immediately or suddenly but the joint efforts of the staff officers, the commanders and the party organizations

produced their fruits: the subunits pulled out of the slump and steadily met the planned targets in training and service.

We also worked hard in the tank regiment. Here the staff officers worked by plan. They helped the command and staff disclose reserves for improving the quality of combat training and bettering the organization of the socialist competition and introducing advanced procedures for the training and indoctrination of the men. Here as well a role was also played by the procedural conference for the officer personnel as well as the individual work with the subunit commanders who assumed the obligation to make them outstanding. The experience of other leading units as provided by the staff officers to the tank troops helped them improve the training facilities and increase training effectiveness and the use of the equipment and weapons.

The questions of improving the work style of our officers in the units and subunits are constantly at the center of attention of the party organization of the formation's staff and headquarters. Certainly this is the main area of its activities.

Before writing this article, I met with the secretary of the party bureau, Maj I. Borovkov. Igor' Dmitriyevich [Borovkov] and I had repeatedly tried to analyze the work of the party organization and the effectiveness of the joint efforts. Had the communists been concentrated on seeking out reserves for constantly increasing the combat readiness of the units and subunits? Had we made an effort to thoroughly examine the lagging collectives or had we been swamped in routine matters? Had we ultimately carried out the main task of helping to establish a Leninist style of work in all areas? Such a style which would organically bring together efficiency and discipline with bold initiative, professionalism with a desire to achieve the major goals, a critical attitude toward shortcomings with a readiness to more quickly rectify them.

The party organization examined the activities of each communist precisely from these positions at the meetings, the sessions of the party bureau and in the process of individual work. Here are the agendas of previous party meetings: "The Communist--An Active Party Fighter," "On the Honor and Duty of the CPSU Member" and "On the Role of the Headquarter Communists in Improving the Leadership of the Training Process" and the corresponding speakers were the commander, the chief of the political section and the deputy commander of the formation. Each time the reports and speeches exactly and thoroughly assessed the attitude of the communists to the assigned job, their position in life and involvement in sociopolitical work. As a rule, the criticism and self-criticism were of a constructive nature and impelled one or another party member to take a closer look, to straighten up, and to better carry out his service and party duty.

The work experience of advanced officers in the troops, Marxist-Leninist training, professional training and other forms are widely employed in developing high professional and political qualities in all the staff communists. The formation's political section and the party bureau keep close watch over how the communists study and carry out the party decisions, the orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and they hear reports and statements by

individual comrades on these questions. Periodically colloquiums are organized on such traits of a Lenin work style as a creative, scientific approach to the job, ties with the masses and the ability to consider their experience, implacability against any manifestations of formalism, bureaucracy and sham. For example, a colloquium on the materials of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held with undoubted benefit for all. In the course of a frank discussion, particular attention was focused on the party's increased demands on responsibility, discipline and the moral make-up of the communist leader, his closeness to people and active involvement in their indoctrination.

The party bureau has devoted a good deal of attention to creating among the staff officers an atmosphere of friendly work, mutual aid and a considerate and demanding attitude toward those who have recently begun working with us. Such a practice, in particular, has been established in the collective headed by the communist A. Kharitonov, an officer with many years of experience. Inherent to his subordinates Maj L. Trufanov and Capt Yu. Solenov are high awareness, conscientiousness and a responsible attitude toward the job. In working in the units, they act as organizers and indoctrinators. Here there are no "narrow" specialists. The party bureau has generalized the advanced experience of communist Solenov and has put out a special bulletin.

A very great deal depends upon the work style of a staff officer, his competence and professionalism. Both the precise organization of the training and indoctrination process, the service of the troops and the punctual, effective fulfillment of the training plans, the generalizing and dissemination of advanced experience, the prompt disclosure and elimination of shortcomings.

Supposedly everyone is perfectly aware of this. But let us ask a simple question: where is the staff officer's work area? In an office, behind a desk? Undoubtedly, here he works out and clarifies the necessary documents related to the planning and organization of combat training, he ensures the rapid transmission of orders, he supervises their fulfillment on the spot and carries out other, equally important tasks. But at times, in devoting all his energy to this, a person goes to an extreme. Then to the detriment of actual organizational work he literally "sits" on the telephone, issuing instructions, gaining information, and spending weeks on the compiling of reports and papers. It sometimes happens that a staff officer becomes divorced from life, he does not know the true state of affairs in the units and subunits and becomes a sort of a recorder of events or an "outsider." Such a "paper" style often gives rise to bureaucracy and red tape.

Yet it is not so much the "office and desk" themselves which give rise to this. A worker, having arrived in the subunits, is basically concerned with the collecting of facts and the writing up of reports. There is neither a profound analysis, an interpretive generalization or active carrying out. It also happens that an officer spends a long time in the units, but the situation in his area does not change. Let me give examples. Lt Col I. Makurin has worked systematically in the inferior staffs, but still was unable to achieve proper order in the area assigned to him. Before one of the exercises, Maj P. Belkovskiy paid a call on a subunit subordinate to Makurin. He spent some time there. Certainly he was not idle. But he did not delve deeply into the training of the personnel. He limited himself to a superficial inspection and did not

discover the omissions in the knowledge of the men. Had he shown a more responsible attitude toward the assigned job he undoubtedly could have discovered the shortcomings and eliminated them without harm to the task subsequently carried out by the subunit. Thus, the mere presence in the inferior collectives still does not guarantee success in the matter.

Formalism takes many forms. How frequently it accompanies a desire to show bustling activities in skimming over the surface or a desire to "be in attendance." I am not saying that this phenomenon is widespread. But it is apparent in some places and in some things.

At one time Officer A. Gagarin was entrusted with heading a camp assembly and they took into account his high general training, his certain experience and ardent assertions that everything "would be fine." But it turned out that the man was unable to self-critically assess his actions. He neglected the organization of combat training, troop service and routine under field conditions. At the same time, many subunit officers needed professional help. This should have been given, he should have been concerned with coordinating their efforts and paying attention to the unsolved questions and organize supervision over the precise fulfillment of the combat and political training plans and the observance of the daily regimen. Instead of this there was poorly concealed disdain and shouting. As a consequence the men ceased turning to their senior comrade for advice and aid. Things got worse. At the end of the week Comrade Gagarin, having left the personnel, went off to rest. I anticipate the question: "What is blameworthy in this?" In principle, nothing. Only precisely at this time in the camp assembly there was a major infraction of military discipline caused to a significant degree by shortcomings in the servicing of vehicles.

I remember that after this case, the question arose of whether a staff officer must constantly go into all the details? If the matter has been well organized, this is not essential. The appropriate officials exist for this. But it is the duty and obligation of each staff worker to help create a healthy moral climate which excludes eyewash and to institute control and proper order which exclude the possibility of the violating of discipline. In any capacity, he must be first of all an organizer who is able to delve deeply into the essence of the phenomena.

Obviously we, the leaders, as well as the party organization at times have been excessively reliant on the fact that in recent years the staffs have been manned by officers who have good ideological-theoretical and military training. At the same time the demands placed on the staffs and their work style have been constantly growing. This has been due to the complexity of the tasks carried out by the units and to the presence of a real military danger. This is why we ourselves must set the tasks more clearly, we must instruct the officers more carefully in sending them out on a mission and we must more strictly supervise what they have done on the spot. Of course, in a spirit of the party's present instructions, we must increase basic exactingness and instill an awareness that a staff worker should always be a model of clarity, organization, flawless efficiency and high culture.

Each staff officer has his own, clearly defined functional duties. Above all, he is obliged to carry them out flawlessly. But this in no way means that the communist staff worker has merely to act in the role of a narrow specialist or particularly to limit the sphere of his influence to just that area for which he is directly responsible. A staff communist is an experienced political fighter of the party with a calling to carry its ideas into the masses of soldiers and to actively carry out its decisions and demands. It is important that in the unit or subunit they see in him not merely an inspector but rather an interested fighter for high combat readiness. As practice shows, the results of his work are always more tangible if he not only thoroughly brings out and helps eliminate what impedes effective combat training but also delves into the moral-political atmosphere of the troop collective, the state of discipline and the course of the competition, if he gives a report or talk to the men and gives them advanced experience.

It has long been pointed out that in order to train and indoctrinate subordinates skillfully and to exercise supervision over the state of affairs, a staff officer must possess a broad political viewpoint and profound knowledge; if one looks more widely he must hold advanced positions on all questions of combat training and military service. When he himself is competent, when he knows military affairs perfectly and ensures the successful carrying out of the tasks in his job, it is easier to demand the same from others and to realize the principle "do as I do." Certainly, such qualities do not come automatically. They are inculcated and indoctrinated by the entire organization and style of work in the staff and headquarters as a whole and by the effect of the party collective. Here there are no minor details.

I feel that even the appearance of a staff officer influences his authority. Unfortunately, certain comrades, in coming to us after serving in line positions, assume that now they do not need to be particularly concerned with appearance. Life shows that sloppy appearance, as a rule, coexists with a negligent performance of service duties.

The training year is in its final stage. Time of summing up the results of combat and political training is a time for a demanding analysis of the staff's work style and the depth of its influence on the quality of the training and indoctrinational process.

In analyzing the results, we must also think about how we can better carry out the tasks which tomorrow poses for us. Such analysis is also underway in the party organization of the formation's staff and headquarters. The main assembly of the year is at hand, the report and election meetings. Undoubtedly these will thoroughly examine the questions of improving the work style of the staff communists and the strengthening of their vanguard role in the struggle to increase combat readiness, to strengthen military discipline and in the ideological work and indoctrination of the personnel. Reserves will be sought out for a more effective influence of the party organization on each communist. And these exist. These are both the showing of greater concern for the ideological and theoretical growth of the party members as well as a more attentive and demanding approach to the deeds and service of each CPSU member.

It cannot be said that the party bureau has not been exacting. Strict demands were placed, in particular, on the already mentioned communist A. Gagarin and Comrades V. Yeremichev and N. Radionov were held responsible. Undoubtedly this brought definite good. But in analyzing the existing practices, we should be concerned with the following. Most often party action is taken against those who have committed, as is said, something flagrant. But what about the unenterprising persons, those who are accustomed to work "neither more nor less" in carefully performing their duties.... Do they often fall under the view of the party body? It must certainly be admitted that this is not always the case.

Hence, the staff communists and the party organization as a whole must also find time to influence those who work according to the principle "from nine to five."

At times in our party meetings there is criticism of the communists from the units and subunits. A speaker sharply rebukes the shortcomings of others, in demonstrating examples of "criticism from above" and forgetting to direct it at himself. The party organization fights against such attitudes. But there is still much to be done to teach all the communists to view the state of affairs from the standpoint of their own personal responsibility for their improvement and to draw conclusions for their own practical activities.

To put it briefly, there still are many unsolved problems. We are aware of them. Both through official and party channels we are taking measures to make the work style of the staff conform to the party's present-day requirements and so that each communist officer possesses the qualities of an organizer and indoctrinator and is an active advocate of effective combat training, strong military discipline and high combat readiness of the units and subunits.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

WIDER, BETTER USE OF INTERNAL PARTY INFORMATION URGED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 83 pp 55-61

[Article by Col V. Trushin, chief of the Section for Party Organizational Work under the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Baltic Military District: "A Most Important Instrument of Party Leadership"]

[Excerpts] Party information is one of the most important levers for correct, scientifically sound party leadership over society and one of the means for indoctrinating the communists and all the workers and involving them actively in communist construction.

"We need complete and true information," emphasized V. I. Lenin. He viewed well organized information in the party as one of the indispensable conditions for consistently carrying out the principle of democratic centralism and repeatedly pointed out that the leading party bodies should have in front of themselves an accurate picture of activities by the local organizations. Without complete and true information, Lenin felt, "we have neither eyes, nor ears, nor hands...." At the same time, V. I. Lenin gave exceptionally important significance to having the communists well informed about everything happening in the party, in constantly being up on all its affairs and profoundly understanding its policy.

The CPSU By-Laws entrust the local party bodies with the duty of "systematically keeping the superior party body informed," and at the same time provide that the leading party bodies should regularly inform the party organizations of their activities. The 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed that intraparty information is an inseparable element in the democratic life of the CPSU. The necessity of improving the organization of information coming from above downwards and from the bottom to the top is caused, as follows from the decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, by the increased scale and complexity of the tasks in communist construction, by the need to strengthen ideological and mass political work, by the increased social activity of the masses and by the acute clash between the two ideologies--communist and bourgeois.

Information from above and information from below are closely interrelated and in essence represent a single whole. The information coming from above causes a response influx of information from below which in turn is taken into account by the leading party bodies and is reflected in their activities.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, information is organized and developed on the basis of the general party requirements. The political bodies, the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations consider it their duty systematically, profoundly and accessibly to explain to the communists, the Komsomol members and all the men the materials and decisions of the party congresses, the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the other party documents, the major events of domestic and international life as well as the laws of the Soviet state, the orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the specific tasks confronting the personnel. At the same time, our military personnel possess very rich experience in conducting the party information from below upwards. Pertinent, fresh and objective information coming from the subunits and units helps the commanders and political bodies better assess the situation, to take correct decisions and to mobilize the men to successfully carry out the combat training tasks and steadily increase combat readiness.

In order to improve the information from above downwards, it is important to ensure the fulfillment of the demand of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on further strengthening the ties of the communist leaders with the masses. The district political directorate has paid more attention to the regular delivery of political reports by the leaders to the personnel and to promptly informing them of the tasks of military and political training, the development of military science and technology as well as the military-political and international situation. In the party organizations scores of generals and officers from the district spoke in conducting the unified political day devoted to the results of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The district political directorate is also improving party information running from the bottom upwards. Such information also performs the function of an instrument of leadership and a means of supervision. It helps the political bodies better understand the situation and to more fully consider the experience and opinion of the primary party organizations and all the communists as well as the requests and proposals of the men. Well organized information from below disciplines the personnel, it contributes to their correct indoctrination, it more accurately reproduces the picture of how the combat and political training plans and the assumed socialist obligations are being fulfilled and gives a fuller idea of the political-moral state of the troops, the condition of personnel discipline and the effectiveness of the party political measures.

In improving information from below, the political bodies endeavor to give it greater concreteness, regularity, objectivity and purposefulness. They also very effectively employ such channels as the party and Komsomol meetings, personnel assemblies, statements by the communists, letters from servicemen, workers and employees, members of their family, statistical materials and official documents. An important source of information is the questions asked of lecturers and reporters in holding the unified political days as well as the question and answer evenings. Often these are very important questions which result in the corresponding conclusions and measures by the leading bodies.

Instances of non-objective information which embellishes the state of affairs in the units, unfortunately, are still encountered. For example, reports were received on the effective influence of the party organizations on the state of

combat training from the political section where Lt Col Ye. Sachkov is the deputy chief. In actuality, here the exercises in many subunits were carried out in a simplified situation, there were substantial shortcomings in the maintenance of the equipment and weapons while the party organizations did not take effective measures. The political directorate cautioned the political section on the inadmissibility of such an approach to providing information on the situation on the spot.

Many questions of party organizational and ideological work are still not given sufficiently broad treatment and thorough analysis in the party information. Information on the effectiveness and quality of the training process and on the state of troop discipline could be more substantial and concrete. In the materials under discussion often little is said about the men, their training and life. A thorough and systematic study and generalization of the moods, needs and requests of the personnel, the ability to draw practical conclusions and on the basis of this organize indoctrinational work with the men more concretely--party information should help in carrying out this task. The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed to the importance of an accurate and thorough knowledge of the life, needs and interests of the Soviet people and their requests, a maximum attentive approach to worker proposals and the need in the work of the party and state bodies for greater publicity and regular reporting by leading workers to the population.

It must be admitted that our informative materials concerning the political-moral state of the personnel and troop discipline--and their proportional amount in the information system is rather significant--frequently poorly and one-sidedly show the situation in the collectives, the mood of the men, their needs and requests. Often a gravitation to a set routine is felt. As an example, the reports received by the political directorate from the political bodies where Officers Yu. Zakharov and I. Tryukhan work contain, as a rule, a list of measures carried out and conclusions that the moral-political state of the personnel is healthy. Certainly a general conclusion is correct and it is necessary. But in any healthy collective there are phenomena which should be taken up and disclosed. In the reports, it is important to profoundly analyze the processes occurring in the units, to generalize the positive experience and draw conclusions on how to achieve a further improvement in party-political work.

The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee called letters from readers, TV viewers, radio listeners and articles by worker and rural correspondents a sensitive barometer of public opinion and a full source of the thoughts, experience and initiative of the masses. The district political directorate regularly discusses the problems of the district and large-run press, it hears reports from the editors to the political directorate and from individual workers in the sections and it helps achieve effectiveness of critical comments and to combat pro forma answers. For example, the political directorate assumed a serious attitude toward the criticism of a number of construction organizations by the district newspaper ZA RODINU and helped adopt specific measures relating to the critical alerts. The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee sharply posed questions related to the combating of formalism in party work, when one is satisfied merely with the form or appearance of a deed. It must be admitted that such phenomena are encountered in our party organizations when it is a

question of party information. A person seemingly has done a useful thing: he has phoned "upstairs" and forwarded a report. But why did he take up his and others precious time if his information enriched no one, if it did not raise a single important question or did not contain a valuable observation, generalization or vital experience in party life? At a recent tactical exercise, one of the political workers, in response to a criticism of him over the content of information, said with surprise: "But I sent you ten pages!" Ten pages of telegraph text, ten pages, as they say, of just pen-pushing. Such an attitude to such an important undertaking cannot be considered normal. The essence is not in the amount of reports but rather their content. However, much informative material from the exercises, for example, often merely records completed facts and the further course of events is not predicted in them on the basis of analysis. The activities of the political bodies and party organizations in these documents are viewed from the standpoint of previous experience and not considering the demands of modern combat. There are not enough serious efforts at studying all aspects of increasing the moral-psychological training of the personnel under the conditions of employing new types of weapons and combat equipment.

In speaking about the shortcomings in the organization of party information, in the course of the reports and elections of the party bodies, the communists have pointed out that this information is not always marked by timeliness. At times it is very late in taking up various negative phenomena in the life and activities of the subunits and units. The negative phenomena have developed and led to serious consequences but they have just begun speaking about them out loud. Clearly, in such an instance, it is difficult to rectify the situation.

In the course of the party report and election meetings, great attention is being paid to a study and analysis of the statements by the communists. We feel this is completely right. They frequently contain instructive experience which must be generalized and made available to all the party members and candidate members. At the same time, in discussing such questions in the work of individual members of the organization shortcomings are detected and other comrades should be cautioned against these.

In this regard, it makes sense to mention the effective practice of holding individual colloquiums with the communists in the party committees, bureaus and political bodies. In analyzing how various successes have been achieved and what can explain the shortcomings in the conduct of the communists and in their carrying out of their party and service duty, the secretary of the party committee or bureau, the chief or instructor of the political section gain reliable information on the service and training of the party members and candidate members and on the state of affairs in the party organization where they are members; on this basis measures can be outlined aimed at improving its work.

It is hard to overestimate such a source of obtaining information on the interests, needs and requests of the personnel as the receiving of the servicemen by officials. In accord with the demands of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of the USSR minister of defense, in a majority of our units and formations a precise system has been established for receiving the servicemen, employees and members of their families, by the commander and political workers. These questions have been raised for discussion by the party

committees and bureaus. However, there are also shortcomings in the receiving of visitors. Probably the main one is that not all the chiefs of the superior political bodies and staffs, the secretaries of the party committees periodically analyze the nature of the questions which the people have or check up on the effectiveness of the measures undertaken upon their request or draw the necessary conclusions from this.

Letters addressed to the commanders and chiefs, to the political bodies and party committees are an abundant source of information. The party constantly demands an attentive attitude to the letters and complaints of the Soviet people as vital human documents. In being guided by the demands of the CPSU, the commanders and the political bodies, the chiefs of the military institutions, military schools, the staffs and the party organizations, as a rule, carefully and promptly review the letters and statements and employ them as a source of obtaining information on the needs, requests and moods of the men. However, there still is a major shortcoming here. We have not achieved a situation where we systematically analyze the content, character of the letters, the proposals and critical comments of the authors and all of this is taken into account in training-indoctrinational and service activities.

Constant concern for further improving the existing system of information will make it possible to further raise the level of party leadership, to strengthen the ties of the political bodies and party organizations with the masses of soldiers and will further develop their activity in the struggle to further increase the combat readiness of the district troops.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

SOVIET VIEW OF REAGAN ECONOMIC, DEFENSE POLICIES TRACED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 83 pp 83-87

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences, I. Shtukaturov: "The Militaristic Dead Ends of 'Reaganomics'"]

[Text] The U.S. Administration headed by President R. Reagan has reached the finishline of its term in office. It is possible now to sum up certain results.

The Republican Party won a victory in the last presidential elections in a situation where the United States was entering a new economic crisis, with increased inflation and taxes and a lag behind a number of developed capitalist states in key areas. This caused dissatisfaction among various strata of the population and the Carter Administration was unable to propose any economic platform which made it possible to resolve these acute problems.

Under the developing conditions, the Republican Party, and particularly its right wing, initiated a demagogic campaign in the course of which the idea was pushed intensely that with the taking over of the White House by their candidate, the situation in the nation would fundamentally change. The candidate for the post of the head of the state R. Reagan assured the Americans that he would achieve stable economic growth, increase employment, reduce taxes, halt the fierce increase in prices and eliminate the deficit in the state budget.

In coming to power, the Republican Administration evolved an economic strategy which has been termed "Reaganomics." Its basic components consist of the following: a sharp increase in military expenditures, chiefly on developing new weapons systems and modernizing the strategic and conventional weapons; reducing taxes for the rich and the monopolies; reducing budget deficits in the aim of halting the growth of inflation; reducing the amount of state regulation over the economy for giving the monopolies a free hand in obtaining maximum profits.

In carrying out the political course of achieving military supremacy over the Soviet Union and preparations for nuclear war, Washington has tightened the screw of militarizing the national economy to the limit, without considering either the interests of the people themselves or the interests of peoples in other countries. Direct military outlays are to increase from 136 billion dollars in 1980 to 364 billion in 1987.

The "Directive Instructions on the Building Up of the Armed Forces for the 1984-1988 Fiscal Years" worked out by the Pentagon and the ensuing strategic plan approved by the political and military leadership should, as they assume overseas, ensure the United States with a potential for victory in an extended nuclear war against the USSR. This envisages an increase of 1.5-fold in the number of nuclear charges in each launch, the construction of 100 new gigantic MX missiles, 100 B-1B strategic bombers and 14 submarines of the "Ohio" class with Trident-2 missiles, the manufacturing of 3,800 air-based missiles and the arming of 150 bombers with them. Significant funds have been allocated also for conventional weapons.

Almost 420 billion dollars have been allocated for carrying out the strategic plan which includes a total of 150 military programs; this total amount includes 106.3 billion dollars on strategic forces and 313.2 billion on conventional weapons.

The carrying out of the Reagan rearmament program is being accompanied by an increase both in the absolute scale of military allocations as well as the relative expenditures, that is, by an increased degree in the militarizing of the economy. This is determined by the ratio of military expenditures in gross national product (GNP) and the state budget. The share of military outlays in the GNP, according to official data, in 1982 was 5.9 percent, in the federal budget the figure was 22.9 percent, and in 1986, respectively, these will rise to 7.1 and 37.2 percent.

The estimates for the degree of militarization have been intentionally understated by the apologists of imperialism. The military expenditures paid for by civilian agencies are not counted; this includes the portion of the budget of the Department of Energy which is developing nuclear weapons; allocations on space research for military purposes; military aid to other states; repayment of debts from previous wars and certain others. These concealed military expenditures approach 80 billion dollars.

If one takes into account all the designated factors, then the share of the GNP, going for military purposes will be not 5.9 percent, but rather over 2-fold more. It must be pointed out that the GNP in the United States is calculated not only from the value of the goods manufactured in the sphere of material production. It also includes the non-productive sphere, that is, trade and various services. All of this overstates the real importance of the GNP and correspondingly reduces the share of military expenditures in it. Moreover, during a period of economic crisis there is a decline in the GNP and due to this the increased expenditures on militarization swallow up an ever-larger share of the GNP.

The military-industrial complex and its supporters in the government are the inspirers, organizers and executors of the aggressive policy and arms race in the United States. The military-industrial complex is a uniting of the monopolies with the state apparatus and brings together into an evil triangle the monopolies which produce the weapons, the Pentagon which determines the weapons systems and their cost and the Congress which allocates the money for producing the weapons of death. Around the military-industrial complex there is an

enormous network of scientific, propaganda and militaristic organizations as well as "think tanks."

The Pentagon concludes contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars with the firms and of this amount one-third goes to the ten largest contractors. The leading positions are held by the military corporation General Dynamics which, according to a statement in the magazine NEWSWEEK, earned over 17 billion dollars in producing the F-16 fighter. The construction of submarines has brought this corporation 13 billion dollars. The corporation receives billions in income from producing cruise missiles, the Shuttle spacecraft (it cost 10 billion dollars) and other military products. This powerful military monopoly has further strengthened its positions by purchasing the tank plants from the Chrysler Motor Corporation.

As a result of the fierce competitive struggle, the production of the B-1 aircraft has been won by the Rockwell Corporation supported by the monopolies Boeing and General Electric. It is expected that the carrying out of the program for building this bomber will cost 100 billion dollars of which Rockwell will receive a good half.

The Northrop Corporation is the head contractor in manufacturing the new Stealth strategic bomber. It also is involved in developing the MX missiles. The military concern Lockheed produces the Trident missiles, transport and ASW aircraft.

After Reagan's arrival in the White House, the leading government positions were filled by the representatives of the California military industrial group. Thus, the former director of the Bechtel Corporation C. Weinberger and one of the main supporters of the arms race became secretary of defense. Another director from this same corporation, C. Davis, was appointed deputy secretary of energy in the department which finances the production of nuclear weapons. Finally, Schultz, the former Bechtel president, was appointed secretary of state. The entire presidential coterie consists of millionaire ministers, supporters of the military-industrial complex and rabid "hawks" who are in favor of the arms race and threaten to bring the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

The military-industrial complex also receives generous gifts from covert forms of financing, tax breaks, preferential supply with strategic raw products and scarce materials, interest-free credits, tax concessions on amortization and the free use of state capital. All of this increases the already high profit of the military concerns.

What are the sociopolitical consequences of "Reaganomics" and the arms race?

The bosses of the military-industrial complex, the Reagan Administration and the bourgeois economists who through thick and thin serve capital have been propagandizing to the skies the long discredited postulates that weapons production is a good since as a result of its growth supposedly new jobs are created and unemployment declines. The facts of economic development indicate that such intensely extolled myths which present the militarization of the economy as a panacea which provides salvation from the crises of overproduction and

unemployment dissipate in being compared with reality. Reagan's economic program and the unprecedented growth of military expenditures have deepened the crisis which the American press has compared with the Great Depression of the 1930's, that is, the most profound economic crisis in the age of imperialism. In terms of the scale of the decline in production, the duration and pernicious consequences for millions of working people, this crisis which exceeded the economic recession of 1974-1975 once and for all buried the hopes of the apologists of capitalism for a "recovery" and "flourishing" of the capitalist economy.

In 1982, industrial production declined by more than 10 percent, by 16 percent in automotive building and by 37 percent in ferrous metallurgy. The load factor for capacity declined sharply in industry: in metallurgy it was just 38 percent, in the automotive industry 53.5 percent and in the sectors producing vital necessities 61.8 percent. Even in the oil industry, drilling for oil and gas declined by 41 percent. The process of a curtailment of production virtually encompassed all sectors of American industry, with the exception of the military.

The arms race does not mitigate, as the bourgeois pen-pushers have written, but rather exacerbates all the contradictions of capitalism which have caused the onset of the economic crisis. The problem is that the colossal financial, material and human resources made available to the Pentagon are employed unproductively, thereby undermining the basis of the nation's economy. Militarization leads to the freezing of material and technical resources which do not take part in creating social product and drop out of the reproduction process. These resources are quite vast. The U.S. Defense Department has accumulated in its hands military property totaling 450 billion dollars. Some 5.3 million persons are directly or indirectly involved in military activities. Enormous scientific potential is diverted into military research and development. Some 18.3 billion dollars, or 10 percent of all the Pentagon expenditures, go for military-end research. This sphere employs 240,000 scientists and engineers.

Actual reality shows that the increased expenditures on militarization do not reduce but rather increase the number of unemployed. Over the first 2 years that the Republican Administration has been in power, military allocations have jumped by 40 percent while the number of persons released from the factories, plants and institutions has risen by 4.5 million persons. According to calculations by a professor at Columbia University S. Melman, the switching of 40 billion dollars from the defense budget to civilian programs would make it possible to create 4.5 million new jobs. To this would be added almost an equal number of jobs in related sectors. Consequently, if billions were channeled into the civilian sectors, this would lead to a significant decline in the army of unemployed.

An increase in the number of unemployed has been caused by mass bankruptcies. Plants are closing one by one in the most diverse industrial sectors and firms are auctioned off. "Companies, large and small," stated the magazine NATION,

"steel casting and agricultural, transport and construction, even energy and electronics, are dying before your very eyes."

The already difficult situation for the unemployed is further aggravated by the fact that the White House continues to cut back on expenditures for social needs. By 1987, they intend to reduce unemployment assistance by 2-fold, food stamps by 3-fold and medical services by 33 percent. All of this causes unprecedented suffering for people. Many unemployed are being deprived of a roof over their heads. Unemployment assistance is received by only 4 million persons while the remaining 8 million can count only on a charitable bowl of soup.

Unemployment is the iron collar which makes it possible for U.S. monopolistic capital to hold the working class in obedience. The union contracts imposed on the workers of automotive and rubber industries and transportation mean direct thievery and the transfer of 200 billion dollars from the pockets of the workers to the safes of the monopolies. The class aims pursued by American capitalism within the country consists in the following: to increase the degree of worker exploitation, to undermine the trade unions and maintain an extremely high level of unemployment.

During the current year, the growth rate of inflation declined somewhat. This is explained by the fact that the presence of an enormous army of unemployed reduced the purchasing power of the population. Standing in line for a free handout, the unemployed are unable to purchase anything while those employed purchase less, putting away their money for a "black day." If demand declines then prices should also fall. However, it is very noteworthy that prices do not decline but rather have been growing, although to a lesser degree. This means that even under the conditions of a calamitous situation for the American workers, monopolies keep consumer prices on a high level and continue to exploit the poor, increasing their already fabulous profits.

The unprecedented militarization of all areas of life in the United States and the enriching of the monopolistic bourgeoisie have caused multibillion deficits in the nation's federal budget. One of the main slogans for Reagan during the election campaign was a promise to balance the federal budget by 1984 while in 1985 income should exceed expenditures by 7 billion dollars. But even in 1982, the budget deficit was 110 billion dollars and in 1985, according to the forecasts, it will exceed 232 billion dollars. This means that the basis of inflation remains, as the budget deficits cause an increase in the state debt and the additional putting of paper money into circulation, thus involving a rise in prices. The state debt in the United States has presently surpassed 1 trillion dollars. Just the paying of interest on it exceeds 90 billion dollars a year. The increase in the budget deficits is the clearest indication of the collapse of "Reaganomics."

Thus, the arms race, the deficit budget financing and the granting of benefits to the military-industrial complex have brought the nation's economy into the blind alley of a budget crisis. At the same time that billions of dollars are wasted on creating "superdestruction" systems, the civilian industrial sectors grow weaker and labor productivity declines.

One of the reports from the American President to Congress pointed out that over the last decade, labor productivity in all private enterprises of the nation was cut in half, from 2.8 to 1.4 percent. The growth rate of industrial production over this time was lower than in the 1960's by almost one-third in the manufacturing sectors, by 2-fold in the extracting and by 7-fold in construction.

In holding first place in terms of military expenditures, the United States has been in last place in terms of the growth of labor productivity and for capital investments into the basic production sectors. This has led to a decline in the competitiveness of American products both on the domestic and the world markets.

The loss of America's former might has intensified the contradictions between the United States, Western Europe and Japan. In setting out on a path of confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Reagan Government conducted a broad offensive also against the positions of its Allies. One of the main spheres of the struggle has been foreign exchange and financial relations. Washington has artificially increased the interest rate and this has been painfully reflected in the economies of the other capitalist countries. The problem is that high interest rates for credit contribute to a flight of capital into the United States, diverting funds necessary for developing the economy of the home countries and strengthening the crisis and unemployment here.

Washington has made a major bet on undermining the economic relations of the Western European states and Japan with the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the sanctions for delivering equipment for the Siberian--Western European Gasline, the Reagan Administration has put more pressure on the competitor-allies, securing from them a reduction in the exporting of equipment to the socialist countries. Aside from the anti-Soviet focus, these measures also serve the aims of weakening the Western European and Japanese competitors.

The United States has succeeded in imposing the debilitating arms race on its Western European Allies and this has also undermined their economic positions. Military expenditures for the NATO allies are 111 billion dollars or 65 percent of the U.S. defense expenditure level, while at the beginning of the decade this share was 35 percent. Regardless of the contradictions existing between the NATO countries over a number of economic and political problems, class interests, however, frequently gain the upper hand when it is a question of the fight against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist commonwealth.

Noteworthy in this regard was the meeting of the leaders of the seven capitalist states--the United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Canada and Japan--in Williamsburg in May of the present year.

Meetings have been held previously for the leaders of the major capitalist states. Usually these discussed economic problems over which differences existed. In the current year as well, the capitalist countries were confronted with many acute problems requiring an immediate solution, for instance: the continuing economic crisis and the growth of unemployment, foreign exchange and financial instability and the enormous budget deficit in the United States causing an increase in the bank interest rates and an inflating of the exchange

rate of the dollar; growing trade protectionism, relations with the developing nations as well as the questions of trade with the socialist states.

However, at the main meeting of the "Seven," economic problems were moved to the background and in essence no decision was taken on them. Under Washington pressure, chief attention was concentrated on demonstrating "unity" and "solidarity of the Western World" around the militaristic, aggressive policy of the U.S. government. The Western European states and Japan put their signatures to a political declaration which established a further rise in the nuclear arsenals and the deploying of American medium-range missiles in Europe. Another step was taken along the path of exacerbating relations with the socialist countries and intensifying the clash with the USSR.

The U.S. economy, thus, has been in the dead end of economic and financial crises, a colossal growth of unemployment and inflation, an astronomic budget deficit and state debt, a sharp deterioration in the situation of the workers and the exacerbation of social and interimperialist contradictions. Regardless of the feigned optimism of President Reagan over the very insignificant seasonal increase in production during the first quarter of the current year, the economic situation in the nation remains complex. The Republican Administration has been forced to abandon many aspects of "Reaganomics" with the exception of the increase in military expenditures.

One of the aspects of "Reaganomics" presupposed the abandoning of the concepts of state monopolistic control of the economy and a return to "pure" competition and the action of the market. Legislative programs envisaged a restricting of intervention into the price regulation mechanism as well as a reduction in taxes and a curtailing of social programs. It was assumed that the increased income of the financial oligarchy and well-off families would tell on increased investments into industry. This would help revive the economy and increase the competitiveness of the American exporters on foreign markets. Then the government would have enough money to eliminate the deficits in the federal budget and carry out an unprecedented program for increasing armaments. However, this did not come about. Capital flowed wherever but certainly not into the basic sectors of industry. In the search for a higher rate of profit, the capitalists began investing in the banking sphere for exporting capital abroad.

The years which have passed since the start of "Reaganomics" have not only not solved the problem of a recovery in the economy but have also led to an exacerbation of the socioeconomic contradictions inherent to capitalism and to a deepening of its general crisis. In describing the existing situation in the nation, the General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party Gus Hall said: "In other words, the present and future generations are generations of economic decline where the quality of life will go down."

Where is the way out?

These problems have been discussed at an annual conference of the American Economic Association in Washington. It pointed out that both the Keynesian formulas (state regulation of the economy) as well as the monetarist concepts (regulating the amount of money in circulation) have shown their ineffectiveness. Consequently, the bourgeois scientists have testified to their impotence for

proposing any realistic measures to escape from the difficult economic situation in which the United States finds itself. The American economists, being under the sway of the limited bourgeois ideas, have been unable to soberly assess the economic situation and fight "Reaganomics" at its central point, the arms race.

The U.S. Communist Party has offered a number of measures for escaping from the existing extreme situation: by reducing military expenditures to nationalize the industrial sectors which have been hardest hit by the crisis, including steel making, to allocate 100 billion dollars for rebuilding the infrastructure, lifting the restrictions on paying unemployment assistance and other measures.

However, the Reagan Administration and the military-industrial complex with a stubbornness worthy of better employment, as before, have hoped to find a way out of the crisis situation by increasing expenditures on weapons, foreign political militaristic expansion, strengthening the exploitation of the workers and plundering the underdeveloped countries. This policy which would bring disaster to the peoples at the same time involves a danger of the outbreak of a new world war.

The unprecedented arms race has caused growing resistance from the American people. All strata of the population have joined the anti-military struggle, including: workers, employees, businessmen, physicians, public and political figures, scientists, priests and various social organizations. An ever-larger number of Americans is aware that the government put into power by the military-industrial complex is acting contrary to the interests of the people.

The mood of the Americans has been reflected in the off-year congressional elections on 2 November 1982, when the people let it be known that they wanted peace and work and rejected "Reaganomics." Catholic priests, representing 50 million American Catholics called for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. All of this is very tangible blows against Reagan's policy.

In tightening the spiral of the arms race, American imperialism, aside from the chief wager on achieving military superiority, is pursuing another aim, that is, of economically weakening the Soviet Union. "The imperialists," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "have not abandoned the notions of economic warfare against the socialist countries and intervening into their internal affairs in the hope of disrupting their social system; they are endeavoring to achieve military superiority over the USSR and all the countries in the socialist commonwealth.

"Of course, these plans are doomed to failure. No one can turn back the course of historical development. Attempts to 'strangle' socialism failed even when the Soviet state was just getting on its feet and was the only socialist country in the world. And this is all the truer now."

Due to the concern of the CPSU and the Soviet government and to the unstinting labor of the people, the USSR Armed Forces possess a sufficient amount of modern weapons and military equipment and are ready to defend the victories of socialism firmly and decisively. The men of the Soviet Army and Navy are constantly improving their combat skill, they are in constant combat readiness and

are maintaining high vigilance. This is essential to rebuff any adventures by the aggressor.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

MEMOIRS OF EARLY WORLD WAR II TANK BATTLES REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 83 pp 88-90

[Review by Col (Ret) I. Igoshev of the book "Za kazhduyu pyad' zemli" (For Each Inch of Land) by I. S. Kalyadin, Voenizdat, 1983, 256 pages, 1 ruble 20 kopecks]

[Text] Many memoirs, historical studies and artistic literary works have been written about the first months of the Great Patriotic War. But still each new book on these difficult and terrible days evokes enormous interest. Among such new works is a book of memoirs by the former military commissar of the XIX Mechanized Corps, Maj Gen (Ret) I. S. Kalyadin, "For Each Inch of Land," published by Voenizdat.

At the very outset of the memoirs, the author indicates what resources the formation possessed at that time. Although the General Staff of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] and the command of the Kiev Special Military District devoted a great deal of attention to the organizing of the mechanized corps, including the XIX, there were many difficulties, particularly with logistics and the providing of personnel for the weapons, military equipment and motor transport. On the eve of the war, the corps included two tank divisions and one motorized rifle division located over the territory of several Ukrainian oblasts. The tanks basically were light BT-7 and T-26 and only an insignificant portion were the medium T-34 as well as the heavy KV, with each battalion having six or seven units of the latter all together.

In assessing the situation in the units at that time, I. S. Kalyadin describes how the men were training intensely under the accelerated training programs. From sun-up to sun-down at the tank driving ranges and fields there were tactical exercises, drills and firings and party political work was carried out continuously. In influencing the awareness of the men by the entire system of ideological and political indoctrination, the commanders and political workers were able to achieve high combat morale among the personnel and a profound understanding of their responsibility to defend the motherland and unflagging political and military vigilance. The book gives examples of the decisive thwarting of attempts by enemy scouts to reconnoiter the disposition of the units and the delivery of new equipment to the troops as well as to organize sabotage.

The commanders and political workers spoke of a possible attack by Nazi Germany on our country as something completely real. On 19 June, the corps staff was visited by a representative of the district staff and was informed of the activities of Nazi air reconnaissance on the frontier with the USSR and of the important decisions taken over this by the district military council. The corps command was ordered during the night of 20 June to bring all the tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, motor transport and communications centers to the assembly areas for the purpose of protecting the divisions against a surprise air attack.

The men felt the approach of terrible events. As was pointed out in the book, among the men and commanders there was a noticeable increase in the feeling of personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the crew, team, subunit and each unit. As confirmation the author gives the summary of reprimands and commendations obtained at the time when the division was already at Rovno: there was not a single reprimand on 19, 20, 21 and 22 June! This fact also to a definite degree reflects the level of the moral-political and combat state of the men. During the dangerous hours for the motherland, they became more demanding and closed ranks more tightly.

In detail and with great documentary accuracy the author describes the first battles which the regiments and the divisions of the corps fought. These were the days when a tank engagement well known in the history of the Great Patriotic War developed in the area of Lutsk, Dubno and Brody. Although our troops did not succeed in restoring the situation in the center of the Southwestern Front by a counterstrike against the Kleist First Tank Group which had broken in, the rate of advance of the Nazis in this sector declined.

The author has been able to clearly show the picture of the first engagement, the outcome of which determined a great deal, particularly the morale of the personnel. At noon on 26 June, the forward detachments of our tank divisions on the march encountered a large column of enemy motorized infantry and tanks. The regiments commander, Maj N. M. Alabushev, ordered the artillery and mortar troops to make a surprise heavy shelling against it in order to immediately stun the enemy and cause it as much harm as possible before deploying into approach-march and battle formations. Our antitank batteries took up positions along both sides of the road on elevations which they had approached covertly, with the howitzer batteries deploying 200-400 m behind them. Having let the enemy come to a short distance, the antitank batteries struck simultaneously at its head and tail subunits. The artillery and howitzer troops devastated the infantry on the armored personnel carriers and the motorcyclists moving in the middle of the column. One after another several armored vehicles exploded and fragments of motorcycles flew off to the side. Now our tanks went into the attack. But the enemy tank troops, although impeded by their motorcyclists and infantrymen rushing about the field, accepted battle.

This duel lasted a little more than 30 minutes. It was won by our men. In losing combat vehicles, the Nazi unit began to retreat in disorder in front of several of our KV and T-34. In taking cover behind their strong armor, the crews of the BT-7 and T-26 successfully destroyed the motorcyclists and infantry. The rout of the German column was completed by the basic forces of the regiment which hurried up and pursued the enemy for almost 5 km.

The meeting engagements ended only late in the evening. The corps personnel had had its baptism in fire. What had made it possible to cause major damage to the enemy? The author answers this question confidently: the enterprising, bold actions of the tank, motorized rifle and artillery subunits which skillfully guessed the enemy's plans and anticipated it in fire and maneuver. During the very first hours of combat, one other remarkable trait of the Soviet military became apparent, a unity, discipline, organization and true comradely mutual aid.

The book gives such examples. The crew of the deputy tank company commander, Lt I. P. Ivanov, was fighting in the point of vanguard next to the tank crew under the command of Pvt S. A. Dorokh who had taken over for his severely wounded commander. They boldly attacked the group of enemy tanks and with their cannon and machine gun fire destroyed three of them as well as two armored personnel carriers and an antitank gun. The commanders of both our tanks were wounded but after bandaging they returned to the battlefield. However, soon thereafter Dorokh's tank sustained three direct hits. The crew was forced to go over to the defensive driving off the enemy tanks and antitank guns by firing from a halt. The communist I. P. Ivanov with his comrades immediately covered Dorokh's tank with armor and fire. Together the crews of the KV and T-34 destroyed another light tank, an antitank gun with its crew and more than a platoon of submachine gunners, remaining in formation.

The company party organizer, the tank driver, N. G. Vasil'chenko, was wounded in the head. Covered with blood, he aimed his tank along an extended line of attacking enemy infantry, he crushed an antitank gun and around ten motorcycles. The motorized rifle troops supported by the tank of communist Vasil'chenko took up an advantageous position and repelled the counterattack by the Nazi infantry subunit which was twice as strong in the number of men. The KV crew of Mil Tech 2d Rank I. S. Medvedev, in the first battle, had to its score seven enemy tanks, several armored personnel carriers and around a platoon of motorcyclists.

The author vividly relates how the success achieved in the first engagements against the enemy inspired the tank and motorized rifle troops. Regardless of the fatigue, the corps command summed up the combat and carefully analyzed all the pluses and minuses. Along with the commanders, the party political personnel did everything to deliver fuel, ammunition and hot food to the forward units and find an opportunity to give the men at least a very brief rest. Certainly tomorrow the enemy had to be dealt new blows and driven out from the captured population points.

But suddenly the order was received for the corps to pull back to Rovno, to take up the defensive there and to firmly hold the line of Olyka, Rovno. It was far from easy to explain this order to the personnel as the men had spared nothing and many had already given up their lives to more quickly expel the enemy from our land which it occupied and were fully determined to advance further. But now we were forced to leave the just liberated places....

The writer of these lines who at that time was a company political worker from one of the adjacent mechanized corps well remembers the drama of those events and the brief but still psychological wretchedness caused by the order to pull

back from the state frontier. In the prewar years, both in combat training and in party political work, we had not even taken up such a difficult maneuver as a retreat. The men had been instilled with the firm conviction that any enemy attack on our country would be driven off by all the might of the Red Army and that the enemy would be unable to advance into Soviet land. But here, after a successful counterstrike against the Nazis which had broken through, there was the order to retreat....

The author must be given his due in correctly showing how the commanders and political workers of the units and subunits using all the means available to them explained to the men the need for retreat caused by the situation on the adjacent areas of the front. This situation was extremely difficult as the enemy had brought up fresh forces and with powerful tank wedges was simultaneously attacking between the divisions and corps of the 5th Army.

A fierce engagement raged day and night in the area of Lutsk, Dubno and Rovno. Around 2,000 tanks were involved on both sides and these were supported by a large number of artillery and aviation. In retreating to the east, the subunits from the corps more and more frequently attacked the enemy from ambushes and this, as a rule, preceded powerful counterstrikes by larger groups and caused confusion in the enemy camp.

The book describes these battles in detail and primarily the heroism and courage of hundreds of tank, artillery and motorized rifle troops. In endeavoring to halt and throw back the enemy which had invaded our land, they endured many hardships. For example, no one complained that food was delivered irregularly while there was a primary concern for the prompt delivery of ammunition, fuel, newspapers and mail.

In order to influence the mood of the men, the workers from the political section of the corps and the political sections of the divisions (prior to introducing the institution of the military commissars, these were called political propaganda sections) maintained close contact with the political workers of the units and subunits, they frequently met with them as well as with the soldiers and commanders and intervened into the affairs of the inferior party and Komsomol organizations and groups directly in the course of battle. This made it possible, as the author has pointed out, to widely propagandize combat experience, the examples of courage and heroism and to promptly spot everything valuable which arose out of the initiative of the men.

On the pages of the book, the reader will find many vivid examples of how the political workers, shoulder to shoulder with the commanders, led the subunits and units into battle and even under the most difficult situation sought out and found the ways and means for influencing the personnel and indoctrinating them in steadfastness in combat, an unbreakable belief in victory and hate for the enemy. Circumstances developed in such a manner that over the first 9 days of the war it was impossible to hold a single party meeting or a single assembly on the scale of a unit, although there was a great need for this. For this reason particularly stirring is the description of the first meeting since the start of the war of the communists from one of the tank regiments. This was held by the edge of the forest on the bank of the Goryn. The men arrived tired and dirty, many with bandages on wounds. Here for the first time since the

start of the war a majority met their friends from other battalions, companies and crews. They had been longing for this meeting because during such difficult days each man felt a lack of a collective analysis of what was happening and wanted to hear the voice of party comrades.

On the agenda were two questions: on the leading role of the communists in combat and admission to the party. Upon the proposal of the party bureau secretary, the communists observed a minute of silence for the memory of fellow servicemen who had fought heroically against the enemy and had given up their lives for the freedom of the motherland. Then came the brief, penetrating report by the regimental commander Maj Vorotnikov followed by comments in debate. Each man spoke persuasively that the communists and all the men would ultimately carry out their duty and stop the enemy, no matter what the cost.

For the communists and all the men in the corps, these words matched their deeds. The farther the enemy advanced the greater the resistance it encountered on its path. The formations of the 5th Army of which the XIX Mechanized Corps was a part for nearly 6 weeks in their section tied down the Nazi assault grouping pushing toward the capital of the Ukraine. The more than double superiority in tanks, the triple superiority in motorized infantry as well as complete air supremacy made it possible for the Nazi command to maneuver the men and weapons freely, to move forward, but this was achieved at a great price. Our men ground down the enemy divisions in unbelievably hard engagements.

With great persuasiveness, the author describes the difficult days of the defense of Kiev, at the walls of which the Soviet soldiers of all nationalities fought with exceptional tenacity and he shows how the workers, white collar personnel and student youth came to the defense of the city.

The memoirs of I. S. Kalyadin cover a short period in the Great Patriotic War, around 2 months. But still the book is noteworthy in the memoir literature. It shows yet another vivid page in the chronicle of combat glory for the Soviet military which took the first, heaviest enemy blows. A majority of them did not live to see the triumph of victory, but they stood at its sources, while their courage and heroism in those battles even now serve as a vivid example of wholehearted loyalty to military duty.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF WORLD REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 83 pp 91-92

[Review by Col P. Panasenko of the textbook for political exercises "Mir segodnya" (The World Today), edited by N. I. Smorigo, Voenizdat, 1983, 160 pages, 25 kopecks]

[Text] A new textbook has been published for the political exercises for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers [the reviewed book]. This small book covers a broad range of questions related to the particular features of the present-day political map of the world and those processes which are occurring in various countries of our world. It provides a general description of the political map of the world and analyzes the fundamental changes in it over recent decades. Basic political-geographic, economic and military information is given on a number of nations of the modern world.

In our world at present there are over 160 states. These are divided into groups of countries which at times differ rather significantly in their historical development, political and economic system, way of life and composition of the population. Nevertheless, each of these states can be put in a certain type. The establishing of the basic types of states is one of the key tasks of political geography and at the same time one of the objects of the ideological struggle.

A correct determination of the type of a state can only be done using a truly scientific ideology, the Marxist-Leninist teachings, and considering the main traits of a specific age. V. I. Lenin pointed out that "only a knowledge of the basic traits of a given age can serve as the basis for considering the more detailed features of one or another country." In relying on this Leninist methodological provision, Soviet researchers, in determining the type of a state, proceed from the existence of two political systems and in accord with this establish two types of countries: socialist and capitalist. In a situation of a powerful anti-imperialist, national liberation and national-democratic movement caused by the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and by the defeat of Nazism and Japanese militarism, a group of nations arose which were named the developing or liberated countries. The authors of the textbook have consistently and rather fully, from the fundamental provisions of the Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, thoroughly examine all groups of countries, thereby again unmasking the antiscientific approach by the apologists of capitalism over the question of the typing of states.

Bourgeois social scientists ordinarily employ secondary features in the establishing of the types of countries. They often base this on natural conditions and as a consequence of this divide states not along sociopolitical lines such as socialist, capitalist or developing, but rather employ such terms as "tropical" and "desert" countries, "sea" and "continental" nations. The dividing of countries along racial lines has become widespread among them and as a result of this individual states are termed "Anglo-Saxon," "Arab" and so forth. Recently the terms of "well off" and "poor" states have been actively employed. The ideological defenders of imperialism endeavor to use such semantic manipulation to "scientifically" prove the "pattern" of the eternal existence of a capitalist society based on the exploitation of man by man and private ownership and to instill the notion that the developing countries by very nature are destined to be subjected to plundering by the industrially developed capitalist powers.

The book opens with a section entitled "The World Socialist System." Running as a constant idea through it is the notion that precisely this is the leading force of the modern world. In demonstrating the great advantages of real socialism over capitalism, the countries of the socialist commonwealth have had the most beneficial influence on the development of the world revolutionary process.

The book gives data on the territory, population, and economic state of the socialist countries. This review starts with a description of the USSR, the largest and most powerful power among the socialist states. The Soviet Union is responsible for one-sixth of the world's population with over 270 million persons and one-fifth of the world's industrial product. Our nation possesses great and diverse riches. The USSR is the only state in the world which is fully provided with its own mineral raw material resources. The peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state conducted by our party and government since its very inception and the constant concern for the all-round harmonious development of man and for social progress have encountered support and ardent approval by millions of people throughout the world.

A significant place in the book is given over to a description of the political, economic, ideological and cultural collaboration among the fraternal socialist states. All three stages in the development of the world socialist system are examined. Here special attention is focused on a description of the present-day, third stage which started in the 1960's. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the Marxist-Leninist parties have played a crucial role in strengthening the unity and solidarity of world socialism.

Of undoubted usefulness is the section devoted to the military collaboration among the armies of the fraternal socialist countries. A description of this commonwealth is provided, the rise and basic stages of its development are examined and the objective necessity of collective defense for revolutionary victories is established.

The book shows the great role of our Communist Party and the Soviet state in creating the fraternal socialist armies. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had helped organize, arm and train for the armies of the friendly Eastern European states some 29 infantry, artillery and air divisions, more than 30

infantry, tank, motorized rifle, artillery, mortar, airborne and combat engineer brigades and a significant number of separate units and subunits. The total number of these formations by that time was 555,000 men. For arming them the Soviet state turned over 16,500 guns and mortars, over 1,100 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], more than 2,300 aircraft and much other military equipment.

The creation of the aggressive bloc of aggressive NATO states in 1949 raised the question of a collective defensive organization for world socialism. In 1955, the Warsaw Pact was concluded. The book describes the fraternal armies and shows the main areas and forms of their combat collaboration. The idea is emphasized that the most important international duty for the men of the fraternal armies is to strengthen this association and to securely defend the victories of socialism.

How did the capitalist system arise and what is the world capitalist system? The section of world capitalism opens with brief but exhaustive answers of these questions. On the basis of Lenin's works and the documents of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the particular features of imperialism are examined as the higher and last stage of the capitalist system; its reactionary, aggressive and antipopular essence is emphasized.

U.S. imperialism is the leading aggressive force. From 1946 through 1975, the book points out, the United States 215 times resorted to the use of armed forces and threatened other countries with military intervention. It must be added that with the arrival of the current administration in the White House the aggressiveness of U.S. foreign policy has risen sharply.

Violence is a constant accomplice of bourgeois society. In line with this it is essential to note the successfully chosen examples given in the textbook illustrating the morals dominant in the capitalist world which suffers from incurable ailments and defects. Here are some of them. In the "equal opportunity society," as the ideologists of the West usually term the capitalist system, in 1982, there were 30 million unemployed. The crime rate is constantly growing. In the United States, last year, one out of every third family became a victim of violence. A theft occurred once every 8 seconds, a robbery once every 58 seconds and a murder once every 34 minutes.

The armies and military-political blocs of the imperialist states are examined in a special section. Their aggressive essence is described in a well-argued manner. This is to serve as a means for the reactionary forces of imperialism to maintain their economic and political domination and as a means for suppressing worker actions within the country and enslaving the peoples of other states. In the strategy and tactics of modern imperialism, military preparations against the socialist countries are the central focus.

The last, fifth section of the textbook is devoted to the liberated nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. They are a great force which possesses significant potential. In confirmation of this, for example, the following data are given: the more than 120 developing countries which are members of the United Nations make up over 60 percent of the territory and almost 70 percent of the population in the entire nonsocialist portion of the world.

The book points out that in terms of socioeconomic development, the liberated countries can be divided into two basic groups. The first group is made up of socialist oriented countries which are carrying out fundamental socioeconomic changes in the interests of the masses of people and a consistent anti-imperialist course. In the second group are the countries following the capitalist path of development. However, the peoples of the liberated states which are experiencing the suppression of neocolonialism are more and more persuaded that only a noncapitalist path of development can bring them to true freedom and happiness.

In conclusion we must note the timeliness of the publishing of the reviewed textbook. In our times the world is developing with particular dynamicness and the publishing of a comparatively small but very informative book which considers all the most important changes on the political map of the world in recent years will help the Soviet military add to their knowledge and, consequently, to analyze and assess the events of international life with great ability and soundness.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1983.

10272

CSO: 1801/101

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

25 January 1984